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  BUCKLEY 2.0: WOULD THE BUCKLEY COURT  
OVERTURN CITIZENS UNITED? 
Miriam Galston* 
ABSTRACT 
Since Buckley v. Valeo was decided in 1976, a series of decisions claiming to rest upon its foundations have 
eroded the campaign finance framework that it erected, culminating in the Citizens United decision and its 
progeny, SpeechNow.org.  During the same period, campaign financing has been transformed by the 
skyrocketing cost of campaigns, innovative campaign practices, rapid increases in the amount of money injected 
into elections by business interests, an increasingly small number of high-wealth individuals accounting for an 
increasingly large percentage of campaign spending, and a trend toward employing dark-money campaign vehicles 
and adopting other strategies to evade campaign finance disclosure rules.   
Many critics of Citizens United believe that the real villain is Buckley and, thus, that there is no way to 
undermine Citizens United without overturning Buckley.  This Article rejects that understanding and the 
assumption upon which it is based: that Citizens United faithfully adhered to Buckley in reaching its holdings 
about corporate political speech.  It argues instead that Citizens United can be invalidated based upon 
Buckley’s own doctrines and reasoning and, moreover, that were the original Buckley Court to review Citizens 
United (a thought experiment this Article calls “Buckley 2.0”), it would overturn the later case.  
Buckley 2.0 would re-assess Citizens United based upon its own understanding of the original Buckley’s 
principles and reasoning and in light of empirical evidence derived from contemporary campaign practices.  It 
would also demonstrate the ways Citizens United disregarded the explicit teachings of other precedents it claimed 
to follow.  The result is a more faithful reading of the original Buckley and subsequent campaign finance cases, 
coupled with a more honest recognition of campaign financing realities that threaten the integrity of representative 
government in America. 
The immediate result of Buckley 2.0’s analysis would be to restore the provision of federal campaign finance 
law requiring corporations to use money raised by their political action committees (“PACs”) to fund independent 
expenditures.  The Article demonstrates that invalidating Citizens United would leave business interests the 
ability to raise enormous sums of money to finance their campaign spending and to engage in issue advocacy.  
Thus, Buckley 2.0’s rejection of Citizens United would leave business interests able to communicate their 
views widely and effectively to the public using a combination of regulated and unregulated funds. 
A more far-reaching consequence of Buckley 2.0’s invalidation of Citizens United would be to invalidate the 
holding of SpeechNow.org, which relied on reasoning from Citizens United to hold that individuals and 
groups can give unlimited amounts of money to organizations that engage in independent campaign spending.  The 
amount of money raised by such vehicles since 2010 has been immense, has profoundly altered the financing of 
contemporary campaigns, and has reduced transparency in campaign financing.  Thus, by rejecting Citizens 
United, and thereby undermining SpeechNow.org, Buckley 2.0 would roll back some of the worst excesses 
of contemporary campaign-finance law and practice.  
 
*  Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School.  B.A., Cornell University, Ph.D., 
University of Chicago, J.D., Yale Law School.  I am deeply grateful to colleagues who commented 
on an earlier draft of the article: Brian Galle, Bill Galston, Michael Malbin, and Dick Pierce.  My 
thanks also go to Lori Fossum, Isabel Agnew, Lauren Kim, Aaron Parnas, and Alycia Stokes for 
invaluable research assistance and to the editors at the Journal for their careful editing.  
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INTRODUCTION 
If you read Supreme Court campaign finance cases, you will be struck by 
the disconnect between the lofty rhetoric used to justify the constitutional 
protections political speech is afforded and the impoverished sound bites and 
hyperbolic attack ads that dominate contemporary electoral 
communications.  The origin of this disconnect is in large part two 
phenomena.  First, in the last decade the Court has failed to take the factual 
record seriously and, as a result, has made generalizations that are belied by 
contemporary campaign practices.  Second, it has misrepresented the 
content of several election law precedents so as to claim consistency with 
decisions at odds with its rulings.  As a result, the Court has created an 
alternative universe that only First Amendment absolutists find credible, and 
it has constitutionalized an increasingly corrupt electoral landscape. 
 All campaign finance cases rely, in varying degrees, on Buckley v. Valeo,1 
the first Supreme Court decision to evaluate the constitutionality of the 
Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), enacted in 1971.2   Citizens United3 
relied repeatedly on Buckley to reach its holding that it is unconstitutional to 
prevent corporations and unions from using their general business revenues 
for campaign spending, assuming that their actions are not coordinated with 
candidates and their campaigns.4  As a consequence, many critics of Citizens 
United believe that the real villain is the Buckley decision and, thus, that there 
is no way to undermine Citizens United without overturning Buckley, 
presumably by a constitutional amendment declaring Buckley or its key 
doctrines null and void.5 
 
1  424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).  All the Justices except Justice Stevens, who did not take part in the 
decision, joined in the part of the opinion finding that there was a case or controversy.  Justices 
Brennan, Stewart, and Powell joined the entire opinion, but the remaining four Justices joined in 
some parts and concurred or dissented in others. 
2  Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 382 (as amended).  
The law was originally codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq., but sections in Title 2 of the United States 
Code were editorially reclassified in Title 52, Voting and Elections, in the 2014 supplement to the 
Code as 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–26.  See generally Editorial Reclassification Title 52, United States Code, 
OFFICE OF LAW REVISION COUNSEL, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://uscode.
house.gov/editorialreclassification/t52/index.html. 
3  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
4  See infra notes 180, 201, 213, 255–56, 262, 262, 279 and accompanying text. 
5  See Ellen L. Weintraub, Overturn Buckley v. Valeo, POLITICO MAG.,  http://www.politico.com/
interactives/2019/how-to-fix-politics-in-america/corruption/overturn-buckley-valeo (last visited 
Apr. 4, 2020); Scott Casleton, It’s Time for Liberals to Get Over Citizens United, VOX (May 7, 2018), 
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This Article rejects that understanding and the assumption upon which 
it is based, namely, that Citizens United faithfully adhered to Buckley’s 
framework in reaching its holdings about corporate political speech.  It 
argues instead that Citizens United can be invalidated based upon Buckley’s own 
doctrines and reasoning and, moreover, that were the original Buckley Court 
to review Citizens United, it would overturn the decision itself.    
 Buckley spoke very forcefully about the importance of political speech for 
democratic self-government.  Yet the decision did not endorse an absolutist 
position for protecting political speech.6  Rather, Buckley can be seen as 
striking a balance between the free speech claims of individuals and groups, 
on the one hand, with other societal interests, especially the integrity of 
elections in a representative democracy, on the other.  Although that balance 
has been criticized by many, the Supreme Court has so far declined to 
overrule the decision explicitly, preferring to modify several of Buckley’s 
holdings to provide support for its own groundbreaking decisions.7  As a 
result, the balance struck in Buckley between free-speech values and the goal 
of election integrity has been lost, and it has been replaced by political speech 
absolutism justified in pseudo-Buckley terms. 
To draw out the consequences of these developments, this Article 
conducts a thought experiment which analyzes how the Buckley Court would 
decide Citizens United and its progeny, taking into account its original decision, 
precedents relying upon its decision, and the factual and doctrinal changes 
that have occurred since it issued its pioneering opinion.  This thought 
 
http://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/5/7/17325486/citizens-united-money-politics-dark-m
oney-vouchers-primaries; Derek Cressman, End Court-Ordered Corruption, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 29, 2016), 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-01-29/reverse-buckley-v-valeos-40-years-of-cam
paign-finance-damage; BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF OVERTURNING 
BUCKLEY V. VALEO, available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/buc
kley.pdf (last accessed May 17, 2020). 
6  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (citing U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, 413 
U.S. 548, 567 (1973), for the proposition that “[n]either the right to associate nor the right to 
participate in political activities is absolute”). 
7  The main exception is McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014), which expressly invalidated FECA’s 
limit on aggregate contributions during a campaign cycle, despite Buckley’s upholding of that 
restriction.  See infra notes 93–96 and accompanying text.  Criticism of Buckley began with the 
decision itself: five of the eight Justices wrote opinions that concurred in part and dissented in part.  
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 235 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part); id. at 257 (White, J., concurring in 
part); id. at 286 (Marshall, J., concurring in part); id. at 290 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part); id. 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part).  The most consistent critic of Buckley is Justice Thomas.  See 
McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 228 (Thomas, J., concurring) (urging that Buckley be overruled and listing 
five previous decisions in which he called for it to be overruled).  
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experiment is called Buckley 2.0.  Part I examines campaign practices at the 
time Buckley was decided and today and compares the amounts spent then 
and now in constant dollars.  Part II moves to the doctrinal plane and 
analyzes how Buckley 2.0 would likely respond today to issues Buckley decided 
in 1976 or parallel issues arising today, taking into account contemporary 
empirical data and campaign finance practices and doctrines developed in 
the last decade. 
In Part III, Buckley 2.0 considers whether the time has come to overrule 
Citizens United.8  It begins by reviewing the basic principles animating the 
original Buckley decision.  It then examines the reasoning set forward in 
Citizens United that Congress has no legitimate interest in restricting the 
sources of funds that corporations and unions use to support candidates in 
federal elections if these organizations engage in independent spending.  
Based upon the analysis in Part II, Buckley 2.0 would conclude that the later 
case did not faithfully represent the teachings of the original Buckley.  Thus, 
it would reject Citizens United’s claim that its reasoning is based upon Buckley.  
Re-assessing the validity of Citizens United’s conclusion based upon its own 
understanding of the Buckley principles and holdings, and in light of empirical 
evidence derived from contemporary campaign practices, Buckley 2.0 would 
conclude that unlimited spending by corporations and unions—as well as 
unlimited contributions to groups independent in name only—pose a threat 
of corruption and the appearance of corruption sufficient to justify 
restrictions by Congress on the sources and amounts of certain types of 
campaign spending. 
The immediate  result of Buckley 2.0’s conclusion would be to restore the 
provision of federal campaign finance law requiring corporations to use 
money raised by their political action committees (“PACs”) to fund campaign 
messages that urge the support or defeat of specific candidates for elective 
office or their functional equivalent.  As the statistics in Part I make clear, 
prior to the changes initiated by Citizens United, spending by corporations and 
other business interests by means of their own PACs and the PACs of trade 
associations to which they contribute had increased more than eight times  
over their spending at the time of Buckley, calculated in constant, i.e., inflation 
adjusted dollars.  Invalidating the holding of Citizens United would thus leave 
those interests still able to raise enormous sums of money to finance their 
campaign spending, although it would require them to raise the money 
 
8  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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following federal rules governing the funding of PACs.  Moreover, business 
interests would continue to be able to avail themselves of the issue advocacy 
rules to fund without limit messages that omit express advocacy of the 
election or defeat of specific candidates.  Thus, Buckley 2.0’s rejection of 
Citizens United would leave business interests able to communicate their views 
widely and effectively to the public using a combination of regulated and 
unregulated funds. 
    A more far-reaching consequence of Buckley 2.0’s invalidation of 
Citizens United’s ruling would be to invalidate the holding of SpeechNow.org v. 
FEC,9 which relied on the analysis of part of Citizens United to hold that 
individuals and groups can give unlimited amounts of money to 
organizations that engage in independent spending, whether they are Super 
PACs or independent-expenditure exempt organizations, commonly known 
as dark money groups.  As is shown in Part I, the amount of money raised by 
such vehicles since 2010 has been immense, has profoundly altered the 
financing of contemporary campaigns, and has further reduced transparency 
in campaign financing.  Thus, by rejecting Citizens United and thereby 
undermining SpeechNow.org, Buckley 2.0 would roll back some of the worst 
excesses of contemporary campaign finance law and practice. 
 I.  THE ELECTORAL LANDSCAPE THEN AND NOW 
Campaign finance law affects all who participate in the electoral process, 
whether as individuals, business entities, or other groups.  This Part compares 
selected campaign practices at the time Buckley was decided with the most 
recent presidential campaign cycle (2015–2016).  The goal is to establish the 
electoral landscape—the facts on the ground—at the time of Buckley and now, 
so that a hypothetical Buckley 2.0 would have an empirical basis for 
reassessing its original decision in light of contemporary campaign finance 
law and practices. 
There is a tendency to blame corporate spending for many of the ills of 
the campaign finance system.  Those who do this probably mean spending 
by business entities or interests in general, rather than corporations per se, 
given that much business revenue in the United States is generated by non-
corporate entities such as limited liability companies (“LLCs”) and other 
 
9  SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1003 (2010). 
 
May 2020] BUCKLEY 2.0 693 
 
limited liability business vehicles.10  Business interests also contribute money 
or make expenditures through trade associations, chambers of commerce, 
and other interest groups.  The discussion that follows attempts to be precise 
about which types of entities are at issue.  However, because what 
corporations do or fund has traditionally been captured more systematically 
than campaign spending by business interests in general, it is often not 
possible to compare apples to apples.  This is especially true because the 
proliferation of types of business entities and outside groups had not yet 
blossomed in the 1970s, when Buckley was litigated.  Moreover, the disclosure 
rules enacted as part of the original FECA legislation did not become 
effective until April 1972,11 so data from the last presidential election cycle 
before Buckley is incomplete.12  
To provide perspective on the discussion that follows: the last presidential 
election held prior to the Buckley litigation was in 1972.13  The cost of the 
presidential and congressional races combined was $236 million,14 or $1.355 
billion in 2016 inflation-adjusted dollars.15  In 2016, the cost of the 
presidential and congressional races combined was roughly $6.5 billion,16 or 
 
10  See SOI Tax Stats—Integrated Business Data, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Mar. 5, 2020), 
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-integrated-business-data (scroll down to Table 3 and 
follow the 2015 hyperlink) (showing, based upon 2015 returns, that traditional “C” corporations 
account for 1.6 million of 35 million business returns).  “S” corporations file roughly 4.9 million 
returns and LLCs and other pass-through entities accounted for 3.7 million returns.  Id. 
11  See JOSEPH E. CANTOR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REP. NO. 84-78, POLITICAL ACTION 
COMMITTEES: THEIR EVOLUTION, GROWTH AND, IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
55, 64 (1984). 
12  See id. at 63–64 (describing the main private organizations and scholars that collected data before 
the FEC began to collect data systematically).  A comprehensive empirical study of financing the 
presidential and Congressional elections in 1972 is HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 
1972 ELECTION (1976).  In general, the present analysis examines presidential elections rather than 
off-year elections.  The statistics compared include aggregate amounts spent on presidential and 
congressional races unless otherwise specified.  
13    The case was heard by the Supreme Court in 1975 and the decision was published January 30, 
1976.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
14    See HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, Financing Politics: Money, Elections, and Political Reform 16 
(1976).  According to Alexander, the presidential contest cost $138 million in 1972, and the 
congressional contests combined cost $98 million.  Id.   
15    See Inflation Calculator, U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, http://www.usinflationcalculator.com (last 
visited Dec. 28, 2019) (showing that the inflation rate was 474.2%). 
16    See Niv M. Sultan, Election 2016: Trump’s Free Media Helped Keep Cost Down But Fewer Donors Provided 
More of the Cash, OPENSECRETS (Apr. 13, 2017, 1:10 PM), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/
2017/04/election-2016-trump-fewer-donors-provided-more-of-the-cash (listing spending total as 
“nearly $6.5 billion”).  Other sources list the total amount spent during the 2015–2016 election 
 
694 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:3 
 
roughly four-and-a-half times as much as the 1972 federal elections in 
constant dollars.  Some of the increase may be attributable to a larger 
electorate in 2016.17  Yet there have been other developments that could 
have reduced the cost of races, such as many fewer swing states18 and 
competitive congressional races,19  as well as the use of relatively inexpensive 
electronic sources like e-mail and social media to reach potential voters.  It 
is, then, not clear how much, if any, of the 450% increase in aggregate 
election spending can be attributed to the cost of reaching a significantly 
larger electorate.  Other forces appear to be driving the rapid acceleration of 
the cost of federal elections. 
 
differently, ranging from $6–7.5 billion.  See COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., CONFERENCE BOARD, THE 
LANDSCAPE OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: CAMPAIGN FINANCE AFTER CITIZENS UNITED 3 
(2017), available at https://www.ced.org/pdf/TCB-CED-The-Landscape-of-Campaign-Contribu
tions.pdf (listing total as $7.5 billion). 
17    The voting age population in 1972 was 140,776,000.  See Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections 1820–
2012, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, U.C. SANTA BARBARA, http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/statistics/data/voter-turnout-in-presidential-elections (last visited Apr. 4, 2020).  In 2016, it 
was 250,055,734, an increase of roughly 75%.  See 2016 General Election Turnout Rates, U.S. 
ELECTION PROJECT, http://www.electproject.org/2016g (last visited Apr. 4, 2020). 
18   See  William A. Galston & Pietro S. Nivola, Delineating the Problem, in 1 RED AND BLUE NATION? 14 
n.39 (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2006) (identifying roughly twenty-four competitive 
states in the 1976 presidential election and twelve in 2004); STACEY HUNTER HECHT & DAVID 
SCHULTZ, PRESIDENTIAL SWING STATES: WHY ONLY TEN MATTER xi-xvi (2015) (recounting the 
history and concluding that the concept of a swing state is not precisely defined). 
19    Between 1996 and 2016, the number of competitive districts decreased by over half to merely 
seventeen.  See Galen Druke, Want Competitive Elections? So Did Arizona. Then the Screaming Started, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 21, 2017), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/want-competitive-
elections-so-did-arizona-then-the-screaming-started/ (describing how an attempt by the State of 
Arizona to dismantle gerrymandering resulted in partisan battle over the best means for creating 
competitive districts during the 2011 round of redistricting).  According to another source, in 
November 2016 there were roughly 395 safe seats in the House, and of the 40 remaining seats, 11 
leaned toward one of the parties.  See Nathan L. Gonzales, House Ratings, INSIDE ELECTIONS (Nov. 
3, 2016, 3:55 PM), http://www.insideelections.com/ratings/house/2016-house-ratings-
november-3-2016.  In the Senate, in 2016, twenty-three out of thirty-four elections that year were 
considered safe.  See Nathan L. Gonzales, Senate Ratings, INSIDE ELECTIONS (Nov. 3, 2016, 3:56 
PM), http://www.insideelections.com/ratings/senate/2016-senate-ratings-november-3-2016.  
The Cook Political Report has roughly the same numbers.  See 2016 House Race Ratings, COOK POL. 
REP. (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.cookpolitical.com/ratings/house-race-ratings/139359; 2016 
Senate Race Ratings, COOK POL. REP. (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.cookpolitical.com/
ratings/senate-race-ratings/139360.   
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A.  Electoral Spending by Corporations and Other Business Interests 
Business spending on federal elections has risen dramatically, assessed in 
constant dollars, since 1976, when Buckley was decided.20  Even in areas 
where corporations are still restrained by Buckley-era regulations, they now 
inject vastly larger sums into federal races.21  In addition, when Buckley was 
decided, corporations were limited in their electoral funding and spending 
by several campaign finance laws that no longer apply since Citizens United.  
The amounts spent by business interests in areas affected by these changes 
have similarly risen dramatically.22 
1.  Spending by Business Interests Where Law Has Not Changed 
From 1971 until 2002, corporations were allowed to spend their general 
treasury funds (business revenues) on all electoral matters except for expressly 
urging the election or defeat of specific candidates (“express advocacy”) or 
for making contributions to candidates, their campaigns, and their agents.23  
In 2002, Congress amended FECA by enacting the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act (“BCRA”),24 which included a provision prohibiting 
corporations from using treasury funds for “electioneering communications” 
on the eve of a primary or an election.25  Thus, as of 2010, corporations were 
 
20    Buckley examined the constitutionality of federal campaign law, so this Article is limited to federal 
issues, even though state campaign finance developments can affect federal practices.  
21    See Part I.A.1 (examining business contributions and expenditures in areas unchanged by Citizens 
United).   
22    See Part I.A.2 (examining business spending in areas changed by Citizens United).  
23   On the many avenues for corporations to fund federal candidates or campaigns before FECA, see 
CANTOR, supra note 11, at 28–35.  For a history of the legal limits on corporate campaigns spending, 
both state and federal, see United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft, & Agric. Implement 
Workers of Am., 352 U.S. 567, 570–87 (1957) (detailing the historical legal boundaries on corporate 
spending in federal elections).  This history predates the enactment of FECA, which considers 
spending (by individuals or entities) that is coordinated with candidates or their campaigns to be 
contributions to them and, therefore, subject to contribution limits.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 46–47 (1976) (per curiam); 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B) (2018) (formerly 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(7)(B)); 
11 C.F.R. §109.21(b) (2019).  
24    See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) 
(codified at 52 U.S.C. §30118(b)(2), formerly 2 U.S.C. §441b(b)(2)) (amending FECA).  
25    An “electioneering communication” is a communication made using broadcast, satellite, or cable 
media, if it is made in the thirty days before a primary or sixty days before an election, refers to a 
candidate (by name or other identifying attribute or logo), and can be received by at least 50,000 
people in a congressional candidate’s district, a Senate candidate’s state, or, in the case of a 
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required to fund contributions to candidates, express advocacy, and 
electioneering communications using money raised by their PACs, which are 
strictly regulated by the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”).26  Among 
other restrictions, corporations can raise funds for their PACs from their 
shareholders, executives, or administrative personnel (and the families of 
these groups), but not from the general public.227  In addition, the amount 
each contributor can give to a corporation’s PAC is capped at $5,000.28  
Further, PACs are themselves limited to giving a maximum of $5,000 to each 
candidate, although they can also contribute additional amounts to certain 
political committees.29  As a rule, these restrictions provided corporations 
with a smaller pool of funds and limited them to smaller contributions for the 
three types of restricted activities than would have been possible in the 
absence of the FECA limits.  Unions were similarly limited with respect to 
using their PAC funds for contributions and for spending on express 
advocacy and electioneering communications.30 
As discussed below, in 2010, Citizens United held that corporations can use 
their treasury funds on spending that is independent of candidates and 
 
candidate for President, in the United States.  See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3) (2018) (formerly 2 U.S.C. 
§ 434(f)(3)); 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a)–(b) (2019).  See also infra notes 118–22 and accompanying text. 
26    52 U.S.C. §30118 (2018) (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), (b)(4)(A)(i)).  FECA does not speak about 
PACs, but about “political committees,” which include PACs and other groups involved in federal 
elections. 
27 52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(4)(A)(i) (2018) (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(A)(i)).  Corporations are 
permitted to solicit permitted parties twice a year, by mail to their homes, as long as procedures are 
adopted to prevent the corporation from determining who had contributed nothing or less than 
fifty dollars.  Id. § 30118(b)(4)(B) (formerly 2 U.S.C. §441b(b)(4)(B)).  Early research found that most 
of the money raised came from high-level personnel.  See John R. Mulkern, Edward Handler & 
Lawrence Godtfredsen, Corporate PACs as Fundraisers, 23 CAL. MGMT. REV. 49, 51 (1981).  
Corporations are permitted to use their business revenues to pay the expenses of administering their 
PACs.  See 52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(2) (2018) (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 441b). 
28   52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(C) (2018) (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C)).  This statement was true of 
multicandidate PACs only.  If a PAC did not give to at least five different candidates and raise 
money from fifty people, the maximum contribution to it was $1000.  However, most PACs 
qualified for the larger contribution.  See Frank J. Sorauf, Political Action Committees, in CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 123 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 1997). 
29    See 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(2)(A)–(C) (2018) (formerly 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(2)(A)).  
30    See Id. § 30118(b)(4)(A)(ii) (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), (b)(4)(A)(ii)) (limiting unions to soliciting 
contributions from unions members and their families); Id. § 30118(b)(4)(B) (formerly 2 U.S.C. 
§441b(b)(4)(B)) (permitting unions to solicit members twice a year by mail at their homes as long as 
procedures are adopted to prevent them from determining who has contributed nothing or less 
than $50). 
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campaigns.31  This means that corporations can now use general business 
revenues for express advocacy and electioneering communications as long as 
they do not coordinate with candidates or their campaigns when they engage 
in these activities.  In contrast, corporations must still make contributions to 
candidates for federal office or their campaigns using money from their 
PACs.  Parallel rules apply to unions.32 
Although the same rules govern the funding of corporate PACs and 
contributions from them to candidates today as they did when Buckley was 
decided, the sums corporate PACs and other business interests raised and 
spent at the time the case was decided are very different from what they raise 
and spend today.  These amounts can be divided into contributions that 
PACs make to candidates and other expenditures made by PACs. 
 Because FECA went into effect only seven months before the 1972 
election,33 statistics from 197434 and 1976 provide a better baseline for 
comparison with 2015–2016 than would 1972.35  In those two elections, 
corporate PAC contributions were $2.4 million and $6.7 million 
respectively,36 or $11,680,000 and $28,260,000 in inflation-adjusted dollars.  
In the 2016 election cycle, in contrast, corporate PACs gave approximately 
 
31   Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  Although the plaintiff in Citizens United was a 
nonprofit corporation, the holding applies to all corporations and to unions, as long as they operate 
independently of candidates and their campaigns.  
32    See FEC, CAMPAIGN GUIDE: CORPORATIONS AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (2018), available at 
https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/colagui.pdf. 
33    Prior to the enactment of FECA, which went into effect in April 1972, corporations had no way to 
contribute to candidates.  See Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).  Since 
FECA, they can contribute to candidates using PAC money.   
34    The 1974 election was not a presidential election cycle, but the 1976 election also involved 
predominantly House and Senate contributions since the presidential candidates took public 
financing. 
35    In 1972, the last presidential election before Buckley, corporate PACs gave at least $1.7 million to 
congressional candidates, which would be almost $9.8 million in 2016 dollars.  See CANTOR, supra 
note 11, at 124.  Another source has $3.1 million, but that figure combines “business” and 
“professional” contributions.  See ALEXANDER, supra note 14, at 214.  Professional PACs included 
PACs of groups like the American Medical Association (“AMA”).  Id. at 32–33, 60.  The 1984 
Congressional Research Service overview of federal campaign finance laws lists only contributions 
to congressional candidates because presidential candidates at that time opted for public financing, 
precluding contributions to them by PACs or others, and because PAC contributions to presidential 
candidates have historically accounted for less than 5% of their contributions.  See CANTOR, supra 
note 11, at 64–65. 
36    See CANTOR, supra note 11, at 124.  These amounts are somewhat exaggerated because they are 
based upon FEC data that combined “corporate” and “business” contributions.  See id. at 126 n.2 
(explaining the inconsistencies in FEC reporting of “business” and “corporate” contributions). 
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$182 million in contributions to all federal candidates,37 or roughly six-and-
a-half times the inflation-adjusted amount that corporate PACs contributed 
in 1976.  
Trade associations also represent business interests.38  The category was 
not identified as such in 1972 as it is now.39  In 1974 and 1976, “Trade, 
Membership, and Health” group PACs contributed $1.8 million and $2.6 
million to congressional candidates, respectively,40 which are $8.76 million 
and $11 million in inflation-adjusted dollars.  In 2015–2016, trade 
associations contributed $82.56 million to congressional candidates,41 an 
increase of more than seven times those in 1974 and 1976.  In addition, 
membership and cooperative PACs in 2015–2016 contributed almost $45 
million to congressional candidates.42  These comparisons are rough, among 
other reasons, because health PACs are not broken out in 2015–2016 and 
because not all membership PACs are business oriented, e.g., those of the 
 
37   See FEC, PAC CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES: JANUARY 1, 2015 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 
2016 (2017), available at https://transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/pac/PAC2_
2016_24m.pdf.  Labor PAC contributions to all federal candidates in 2015–2016 totaled 
$46,728,402.  Id.  The numbers reported on the FEC website are slightly different from those 
reported by the Campaign Finance Institute, which applies its own methodology to the raw FEC 
statistics.  See, e.g., CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., PAC CONTRIBUTIONS TO CONGRESSIONAL 
CANDIDATES 1978–2016 (2018), available at http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/federal/HistoricalTables
/pdf/CFI_Federal-CF_18_Table2-10.pdf . 
38    See Tie-ting Su, Alan Neustadtl & Dan Clawson, Business and the Conservative Shift: Corporate PAC 
Contributions 1976–1986, 76 SOC. SCI. Q. 20, 22 & n.1 (1995) (stating that trade association PAC 
contributions are “highly correlated with corporate donations”); CANTOR, supra note 11, at 88 n.2 
(stating that trade associations and health care groups are assumed to have “a basically pro-business 
orientation.”).   
39    See CANTOR, supra note 11, at 126 & n.2.  Another source classifies business, professional, 
agricultural, dairy, and health-related groups as “special interest groups,” see ALEXANDER, supra 
note 14, at 228, but does not distinguish business and professional when it lists contributions. See id. 
at 214.  Alexander does list contributions by dairy, education, health-related, and “rural-related,” 
which includes electrical and agricultural interests, and contributions by these groups totaled 
$3,950,000 in 1972.   
40    See CANTOR, supra note 11, at 125–26, n.3; see also JOSEPH E. CANTOR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
REP. NO. 86-148, CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS: A GUIDE TO THE LAW AND 
ITS OPERATION 36 (1986) (listing $10 million in “business-related” contributions to candidates, 
which included a portion of trade association contributions).  But see HERBERT E. ALEXANDER: 
MONEY, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL REFORM 84 (2d ed. 1980) (stating that corporate and 
business-related trade associations gave more than $7 million in direct contributions to candidates 
that year). 
41   See FEC, PAC CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES: JANUARY 1, 2015 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 
2016 (2017), available at https://transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/pac/PAC2_201
6_24m.pdf.   In 2015–2016, trade associations gave only $213,407 to presidential campaigns.  Id. 
42    See id.   
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Sierra Club and the National Rifle Association.43  Despite these limitations 
in the data, combining inflation-adjusted totals of corporate and trade 
association PAC contributions in 1974 ($20 million) and 1976 ($40 million) 
with comparable amounts in 2016 ($265 million), business-related PACs in 
2016 contributed to candidates between six and ten times what they did 
when Buckley was decided, even though the campaign finance rules in this 
area have remained unchanged. 
The dramatic increase in business-related contributions to candidates for 
federal office has been mirrored by other expenditures made by business 
interests in federal elections (without taking into account their contributions 
to Super PACs and social welfare organizations, which are discussed 
below44).  Typical examples include independent expenditures, contributions 
to state or local candidates, direct mail, contributions to presidential 
candidates in primaries, fundraising, and administrative costs.45  According 
to the FEC, corporate PACs made roughly $5.8 million in total expenditures 
in the 1975–1976 election cycle,46 equal to $24,464,685 in 2016 dollars.  In 
the 2016 election cycle, in contrast, corporate PACs spent $385,710,026 in 
total expenditures on behalf of federal candidates,47  which is more than 
fifteen times what they spent in 1975–1976 in constant dollars. 
 
43    A better comparison might be that in 1974, business and business-related special interest groups 
gave $4.8 million to House and Senate candidates, see ALEXANDER, supra note 14, at 228, or $27.3 
million in 2014 dollars, as compared with $257,264,309 in the 2014 House and Senate races.  See 
Press Release, FEC, Statistical Summary of 24-month Campaign Activity of 2013–2014 Election 
Cycle (Apr. 3, 2015), https://www.fec.gov/updates/statistical-summary-of-24-month-campaign-
activity-of-the-2013-2014-election-cycle/.  Contributions in 2014 were more than nine times the 
contributions in 1974 in constant (2014) dollars. 
44    See infra Part I.A.2 (examining business spending in areas changed by Citizens United). 
45    See CANTOR, supra note 11, at 68–70.  According to Cantor, independent expenditures were 
responsible for an increasing share of PAC spending other than contributions to candidates between 
1974 and 1980.  Id. at 67. 
46   See Press Release, FEC, FEC Releases Index on Corporate-Related Political Committees (Sept. 18, 
1977), https://transition.fec.gov/press/archive/1977/19770918_Index-76PAC.pdf.  There is no 
separate data for corporate PAC expenditures in 1974; for combined “business related” 
expenditures of $8.1 million in 1974, see CANTOR, supra note 11, at 84.  Cantor notes that the 
numbers are “subject to dispute” because of a lack of consistency in standards for types of business 
spending prior to 1978.  See id. at 83–84. 
47    See FEC, SUMMARY OF PAC ACTIVITY, JANUARY 1, 2015 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2016 (2017), 
available at https://transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/pac/PAC1_2016_24m.pdf.  
During the 1975–1976 election cycle, union PACs spent a total of $17.5 million on federal 
candidates. Richard Briffault, Herbert E. Alexander & Elizabeth Drew, The Federal Election Campaign 
Act and the 1980 Election, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2087–88 & n.28 (1984).  That is $73.8 million 
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In addition to direct spending by corporate PACs, business-related trade 
association PAC expenditures for congressional candidates in the 1975–1976 
election cycle was roughly $5.5 million,48 which would be $23.2 million in 
2016 dollars. Trade association PACs spent approximately $65.5 million in 
the 2015–2016 cycle on direct spending,49 or almost three times as much in 
constant dollars.  Given that trade association PAC direct expenditures 
combined with those of corporate PACs were $451,210,026 in 2015–2016,50 
corporate and business-related PACs spent almost ten times in 2015–2016 
what they did in 1975–1976, in constant dollars. 
In sum, combining business-related contributions to candidates with 
other expenditures, business interests spent $716 million in 2015–2016, as 
compared with $87 million in 1975–1976 (in inflation-adjusted dollars), or 
eight-and-a-half times more than in the 1976 election cycle.  This dramatic 
increase does not take into account increased spending by business interests 
as a result of the 2010 decision in Citizens United. 
2.  Business Spending After Changes in the Law 
Changes in the Court’s election-law doctrines have accelerated spending 
by corporations and other business  entities on elections.  Since Citizens United 
held that corporations can use non-PAC money for independent campaign 
spending,51 the amount of corporate expenditures during campaigns has 
increased, although it is difficult to track such spending for two reasons.  First, 
corporations and other business entities are now free to contribute unlimited 
amounts to independent expenditure-only groups.  Some of these 
organizations are exempt from income tax under the Internal Revenue Code 
(“IRC”), are active in political campaigns, and rarely have to disclose or fully 
 
in 2016 dollars, compared with total union PAC spending in the 2015–2016 election cycle of $256.9 
million, see id., which is roughly three-and-a-half times the 1975–1976 amount in constant dollars.   
48   See ALEXANDER , supra note 40, at 84. 
49    Compare FEC, SUMMARY OF PAC ACTIVITY, JANUARY 1, 2015 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2016 
(2017), available at https://transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/pac/PAC1_20
16_24m.pdf, with Press Release, FEC, Statistical Summary of 24-Month Campaign Activity of the 
2015–2016 Election Cycle (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.fec.gov/updates/statistical-summary-24-
month-campaign-activity-2015-2016-election-cycle.  The former source states that trade 
association contributions in 2015–2016 to candidates for President, House and Senate totaled $82.7 
million, while the latter states that total trade association PAC disbursements during that election 
were $148.2 million.  This leaves $65.5 million for all other trade association PAC spending.  
50    See supra notes 47, 49 and accompanying text. 
51    See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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disclose their donors.52  For example, until recently, exempt organizations, 
like section 501(c)(4) social welfare groups and section 501(c)(6) trade or 
business association groups had to list their donors on their IRS information 
returns, although this information was not usually disclosed to the public.  
Thus, the identities of individual corporate or other business entity donors to 
such exempt organizations were not available to the public, but could be 
monitored and quantified by the IRS.  The IRS changed its disclosure policy 
in 2018, so that these exempt organizations no longer have to list their 
donors’ identities on their information returns filed with the IRS.53  The 
IRS’s new position was widely criticized, among other reasons because the 
agency will no longer be able to determine if donors to the organizations are 
foreign persons, who are prohibited by law from funding election activities.54  
The new policy will also prevent the IRS from easily determining  
contributions to such entities by corporations, LLCs, and other business 
entities or by labor unions and similar organizations.  Although a federal 
court subsequently invalidated the IRS action, it did so because the agency 
had not followed the notice and comment procedures of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”).55  Because the court did not rule on the merits of its 
proposal, the IRS did not appeal the decision and instead proposed the 
identical change in a rulemaking allowing for the notice and comment 
 
52    For disclosure, see infra notes 54–72 and accompanying text.  The most commonly used exempt 
organizations are I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) social welfare groups, I.R.C. § 501(c)(5) labor organizations, 
and I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) trade associations and chambers of commerce.  For Super PACs, see infra 
notes 84–90.  Independent-expenditure-only groups are funded with contributions unlimited in 
amount from businesses, unions, or individuals as long as the groups operate independently of 
candidates, parties, and their campaigns.  See infra notes 105–06 and accompanying text.  
Independent expenditures of any size made by individuals singly have been protected by the 
Supreme Court since before Buckley, so they were unaffected by the recent judicial rulings.  Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51 (1976) (per curiam). 
53    See Rev. Proc. 2018-38, 2018-31 I.R.B. 280. 
54    See Press Release, David E, Price, Member, U.S. House of Representatives, Rep. Price Introduces 
Legislation to Overturn Controversial “Dark Money” Rule (Dec. 13, 2018), https://price.house.
gov/newsroom/press-releases/rep-price-introduces-legislation-overturn-controversial-dark-mone
y-rule.  One commentator has opined that the IRS’s decision may be an effort to reduce claims that 
its actions reflect bias against certain groups.  See Philip Hackney, Dark Money Darker? An 
Examination of the IRS Choice to End the Collection of Donor Information on Form 990, at 10–
11 (Apr. 18, 2019) (unpublished manuscript, N.Y.U. Law Nonprofit Forum) (on file with author).  
55    See Bullock v. IRS, 401 F.Supp.3d 1144 (D. Montana 2019); see also IRS, NOTICE 2019-47, 
PENALTY RELIEF RELATED TO RELIANCE ON REVENUE PROCEDURE 2018-38 (2019) (providing 
that organizations that failed to disclose contributors on Schedule B in reliance on Revenue 
Procedure 2018-47 prior to the District Court decision will not be subject to penalties).  
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procedures required by the APA.56  Thus, IRS disclosure rules will no longer 
enable the agency to determine what different donors contribute based upon 
organizations’ annual information returns, although it will retain the ability 
to request such information during an audit. 
 Second, there are FECA disclosure rules imposed on exempt 
organizations funding campaign advertising, but as interpreted by the FEC, 
these have little or no efficacy.  Sections 30104(c)(1) and 30104(c)(2)(C) of 
FECA require an entity making independent expenditures greater than $250 
to disclose the identity of each person contributing more than $200 made for 
the purpose of furthering an independent expenditure and the amount and 
date of the contribution.57  However, the FEC promulgated a regulation 
under these provisions requiring the disclosure of only contributors who 
made donations to fund the specific independent expenditure the entity was 
required to report.58  Because of the discrepancy between the statute’s reach 
and that of the regulation, a watchdog group sued the FEC and won a 
judgment invalidating the regulation.59  In response, the FEC issued a Press 
Release stating that, while it appeals the district court decision, it would 
require entities (other than political committees) to disclose the identity of 
“donors of over $200 making contributions earmarked for political 
purposes.”60  By including the qualification “earmarked,” the FEC seems to 
have created an enormous loophole.  An exempt entity could devote 40% of 
its funds to independent expenditures but, unless those who contribute to it 
earmark their donations for “political purposes,” the entity could claim that 
100% of its contributors would not need to be identified.61  
 
56    See IRS, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Guidance Under Section 6033 Regarding the Reporting 
Requirements of Exempt Organizations, 84 Fed. Reg. 47447 (Sept. 10, 2019). 
57  See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(1), (2)(C) (2018).  This Section incorporates the contents of 52 U.S.C. § 
30101(8)(A) (defining a contribution) and 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3)(A) (specifying that the reports 
filed must identify certain persons and the date and amount of their contributions). 
58  See 11 C.F.R. § 109.10(e)(i)(vi) (2019). 
59  See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 316 F. Supp. 3d 349 (D.D.C. 2018), appeal 
filed sub nom. Crossroads Glob. Policy Strategies v. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 
No. 18-5261 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 30, 2018). 
60  See Press Release, FEC, FEC Provides Guidance Following U.S. District Court Decision in Crew v. 
FEC (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.fec.gov/updates/fec-provides-guidance-following-us-district-
court-decision-crew-v-fec-316-f-supp-3d-349-ddc-2018/. 
61  See Brendan Fischer & Maggie Christ, New Reports Show Why the FEC Needs to Clarify Disclosure 
Requirements for Dark Money Groups—and Why Congress Should Go Even Further, CAMPAIGN LEGAL 
CENTER (Feb. 6, 2019), https://campaignlegal.org/update/new-reports-show-why-fec-needs-
clarify-disclosure-requirements-dark-money-groups-and-why (describing that, notwithstanding a 
D.C. District Court decision, dark money is still largely secretive). 
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The situation for electioneering communications is less ambiguous, but 
no more transparent.  Section 30104(f) of FECA requires an entity funding 
more than $10,000 in electioneering communications during a calendar year 
to file a report that contains, among other things, the names and addresses 
of anyone contributing $1000 or more in aggregate to the entity during that 
year.62  Arguably, Congress intended this provision to require reporting of all 
contributors of $1000 or more.  However, the FEC promulgated a regulation 
requiring disclosure of only those who made such contributions “for the 
purpose of furthering electioneering communications.”63  This regulation 
was upheld by an appellate court that found the agency’s decision was not 
only a permissible interpretation of BCRA; it was persuasive as well.64  As a 
result, despite FECA’s provisions that would appear to require exempt 
organizations active in campaigns to disclose information about their 
contributors, such disclosures are easily avoided and occur quite rarely. 
The exempt organizations in question may use the money they raise to 
fund their own election advertising and other campaign activities.  
Alternatively, they can transfer some or all of their money available for 
campaign spending65 to Super PACs, which are subject to disclosure rules.  
Super PACs are required to reveal the names of individuals and entities that 
give directly to them, but in practice the names of entities are frequently 
generic, so they do not reveal the ultimate donors to their funds.  As a 
consequence, the extent of business spending on campaigns that is funneled 
through certain exempt organization intermediaries cannot be known.  
Similarly, although I.R.C. §527 requires PACs not regulated by FECA to 
disclose their donors,66 the disclosures typically reveal only the immediate, 
not the ultimate donor.  In many instances, then, corporations may be 
 
62  See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(2) (2018). 
63  See 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9) (2019).  The history of the FEC’s ruling process is detailed in Van Hollen 
v. FEC, 811 F.3d 486, 490–91 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
64  See Van Hollen, 811 F.3d at 493. 
65   Under IRS regulations, exempt organizations must be “primarily” devoted to the purpose and 
activities that constitute the mission justifying their exemption from taxation, e.g., social welfare for 
section 501(c)(4) groups, employee welfare for section 501(c)(5) labor groups, and business interests 
for 501(c)(6) trade associations and related groups.  See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(I); I.R.S. GEN. 
COUNS. MEM. 34,233 (Dec. 3, 1969).  The IRS has not published precedential guidance regarding 
the meaning of “primarily” in this context.  For the IRS’s litigating position with regard to the 
primarily standard for 501(c)(4) groups, see Miriam Galston, Vision Service Plan v. U.S.: Implications 
for Campaign Activities of 501(c)(4)s, 53 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 165 (2006).  
66   I.R.C. § 527(j)(3)(B).  The requirement applies to donations of $200 or more in a calendar year.  Id. 
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“hiding behind dubious and misleading names,”67 so their political spending 
is invisible to the public and impossible to quantify.  Further, groups have 
devised other stratagems to evade disclosure of donors’ identities.68  
In contrast, in the case of trade associations and chambers of commerce, 
which are exempt under section 501(c)(6), all their money comes from 
business interests.69  Although the donors to these organizations are also not 
disclosed to the public or IRS, some of their spending on campaigns can be 
captured.  In particular, businesses are usually permitted to deduct the cost 
of dues to trade associations from their gross income, thereby reducing their 
taxable income.70  However, the IRC denies such deductions for costs 
incurred for campaigning or lobbying, whether the money is spent directly 
by the business entity or through an intermediary, such as a trade association 
that engages in those activities.71  Because those seeking business deductions 
for dues or other payments made to trade associations have the burden of 
showing the portion of their payments not attributable to campaigning or 
lobbying (by the recipient organization), the IRC requires that organizations 
tell donors the percent of their payments attributable to the nondeductible 
activities.72  The aggregate amounts spent on each of these activities should 
also be listed on an organization’s information return,73 making possible an 
estimate of the amount each trade association has spent each year on 
campaign-related activities. 
 As a result of the complexities involved in tracing the sources of 
campaign spending by independent expenditure entities, experts disagree 
about whether, or to what degree, corporate and other business spending has 
 
67    McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 197 (2003) (basing its statement on the record in the case). 
68    For example, in the month before a recent special election in Alabama, at least one Super PAC 
bought millions of dollars of advertisements on credit, thereby avoiding the need to disclose its 
donors until after the election.  See Ashley Balcerzak, Mystery Money Floods Alabama in Senate Race’s 
Final Days, CTR. FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2017/
12/08/21368/mystery-money-floods-alabama-senate-races-final-days; see also CAMPAIGN LEGAL 
CTR., DODGING DISCLOSURE: HOW SUPER PACS USED REPORTING LOOPHOLES AND DIGITAL 
DISCLAIMER GAPS TO KEEP VOTERS IN THE DARK IN THE 2018 MIDTERMS (2018), available at 
https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/11-29-18%20Post-Election%20Report%
20%281045%20am%29.pdf. 
69    See 26 C.F.R. §1.501(c)(6)-1 (2019) (stating that a section 501(c)(6) organization “is an association of 
persons having some common business interest,” that is devoted to advancing that common 
business interest, although the organization cannot itself engage in a business for profit).   
70  I.R.C. § 162(a). 
71  See I.R.C. § 162(e); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(c)(1) (2011). 
72    See I.R.C. § 6033(e)(1). 
73    See IRS, FORM 990 sched. C (2020). 
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increased since Citizens United was decided.  According to several sources, 
large, publicly traded corporations have not increased their non-PAC 
political spending.74  However, privately held corporations’ electoral 
spending is not covered by this assertion, and according to one source 
privately held businesses that used treasury funds on electoral spending “were 
among 2012’s biggest sources of outside money.”75  In addition, as noted 
earlier, business spending not subject to contribution limits may not be 
captured when an intermediary vehicle, such as a section 527 organization, 
a Super PAC, or an exempt organization is utilized.76  Data provided by The 
Campaign Legal Center, a watchdog group, reveal that trade association 
groups spent more than $129 million on election advertising from 2012 to 
2016, and I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) groups spent more than $520 million on 
elections during the same period.77  While it is probable that trade 
associations represent business interests, it is unclear what proportion of 
spending by I.R.C. §501(c)(4) groups reflects business interests because these 
groups do not need to reveal the identities of their contributors and their 
missions may be attractive to an array of interests, not all of which are 
business oriented.   
What is known is that overall, contributions to Super PACs in 2015–2016 
by entities of all kinds (such as unions, corporations, trade associations, PACs, 
and Super PACs) totaled $519,000,161, or 32% of contributions to Super 
PACs in that election cycle and that between a third and half of that sum 
came from business interests.78  Again, these are amounts disclosed and the 
 
74    See MICHAEL J. MALBIN & BRENDAN GLAVIN, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., CFI’S GUIDE TO MONEY IN 
FEDERAL ELECTIONS: 2016 IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 1 (2018); COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra 
note 16, at 5, 6. 
75    Andrew Mayersohn, Four Years After Citizens United: The Fallout, OPENSECRETS (Jan. 21, 2014), 
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/01/four-years-after-citizens-united-the-fallout.  
76    See Trevor Potter, Citizens United Defenders Use Deceptive Arguments to Underestimate Money in Politics, 
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (Oct. 26, 2017), https://campaignlegal.org/update/citizens-united-
defenders-use-deceptive-arguments-underestimate-money-politics (arguing, based upon data 
provided by OpenSecrets.org, that Floyd Abrams’s claim that corporate spending since Citizens 
United represents a “comparatively small” part of campaign spending during that period is “highly 
misleading”).  Potter also notes that data based upon corporate contributions to candidates for 
president is misleading because ninety-nine percent of corporate PAC contributions in 2016 went 
to candidates for Congress.  Id. 
77    See id. 
78    COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 16, at 5 & fig. 2.  The remaining 68% was contributed by 
individuals.  See id.  CED’s statistics for Super PACs are based upon an analysis of the ninety largest 
Super PACs, which were the source of 94% of Super PAC spending in 2015–2016.  Id. at 4.  Since 
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immediate donors, whereas, as noted above, there are potentially large sums 
of undisclosed spending that cannot be quantified and misleadingly disclosed 
contributors that cannot be identified.  Thus, since Super PACs became the 
“primary vehicles of outside spending,”79 and outside spending accounted for 
more than one fifth of election spending in 2015–2016,80 business interest 
spending on elections has increased commensurately.  Given that business 
interests have also increased their spending under pre-Citizens United law 
more than eight times,81 it is fair to conclude that campaign spending by 
business interests today has increased dramatically over what it was at the 
time of Buckley, even after correcting for inflation.  
B.  Spending by Individuals 
Since Buckley, individuals singly have been able to spend unlimited 
amounts directly on campaigns if they do not coordinate with a candidate or 
a candidate’s campaign.82  In 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit greatly expanded individuals’ ability to 
influence campaigns by enabling them to give unlimited amounts to groups, 
if the groups act independently of candidates and their campaigns.83  This 
decision, known as SpeechNow or SpeechNow.org, enabled individuals to amplify 
the impact of their spending by combining their contributions with other 
contributions—large and small, made by other individuals or by ideological 
or business groups—in one campaign vehicle acting in a unified way.  These 
independent expenditure groups are now known as Super PACs.84 
Even extremely large amounts spent by a wealthy individual singly can 
have their impact amplified by being combined with contributions from 
other individuals and entities.  The amplification effect will be heightened 
because none of the contributors to the recipient organizations will be subject 
 
Super PACs are only required to report contributors who give $200 or more, the CED analysis is 
based upon 81% of Super PAC receipts in 2015–2016.  
79  ISSUE ONE, OUTSIDE SPENDING IN ELECTIONS (2017), available at https://www.issueone.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/outside-spending.pdf. 
80   Id. 
81    See supra notes 36–50 and accompanying text.  The statistics cited in this section include only 
reported expenditures.  See infra Part I.D (discussing the post-Buckley trend of outside money spent 
on campaign-oriented issue advertisements not subject to reporting). 
82    See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51 (1976) (per curiam). 
83    SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 693, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
84    On Super PACs, see generally R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42042, SUPER 
PACS IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2016); Richard Briffault, 
Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644 (2012). 
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to dollar limits, so the resulting combined funds are in principle unlimited.  
In the 2015–2016 election cycle, Super PACs spent in excess of $1.1 billion, 
which was almost half of the spending of all PACs active in the election cycle 
combined.85  One estimate based upon data available from the FEC found 
that almost 68% of contributions to Super PACs came from individuals.86  A 
large part of that amount came from contributions that would not have been 
legal before SpeechNow.org,87 given that prior to that decision individuals could 
give at most $5000 to a single PAC.88  In the 2015–2016 cycle, of the $1.1 
billion contributed by individuals to Super PACs, the top 1% of individual 
donors (511 individuals) contributed $1.05 billion or 88.6% of all individual 
contributions, and the remaining 50,559 individuals who gave to those Super 
PACs in aggregate contributed 11.4% of the total.89  Similarly, records reveal 
that 85% of the money raised by the Super PAC associated with Hillary 
Clinton’s 2016 campaign came from donors who contributed at least $1 
million dollars.90  Taking into account other unlimited spending vehicles, 
such as I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) organizations, OpenSecrets estimates that the top 
one percent of the top one percent (.01%) of the American adult population 
 
85    See FEC Press Release, Statistical Summary of 24-Month Campaign Activity of the 2015–2016 
Election Cycle (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.fec.gov/updates/statistical-summary-24-month-
campaign-activity-2015-2016-election-cycle/ (identifying $1.8 billion in disbursements from all 
separate segregated fund PACs and all nonconnected PACs); see also NATHANIEL PERSILY, 
ROBERT BAUER & BENJAMIN L. GINSBERG, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN 
THE UNITED STATES: ASSESSING AN ERA OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 38 (2018), available at 
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BPC-Democracy-Campaign-Financ
e-in-the-United-States.pdf (explaining that Super PACs raised $1.8 billion but only spent $1.1 
billion in the 2016 election cycle). 
86    See COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 16, at 5 & fig. 2 (noting that individuals accounted for 
67.7% of itemized contributions to Super PACs, or $1,086,032,803).  This is “roughly double the 
$534 million individuals gave to Super PACs in 2012.”  David B. Magleby, Super PACs and 501(c) 
Groups in the 2016 Election 7 (Nov. 9–10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
https://www.uakron.edu/bliss/state-of-the-parties/papers/magleby.pdf; see also Persily et al., supra 
note 85 (noting the difference between amounts contributed to Super PACS and Super PAC 
expenditures). 
87  See MALBIN & GLAVIN, supra note 74, at 42, tbl. 1-9A (showing that 96% of contributions made by 
individuals and groups to Super PACs for presidential candidates in 2016 were in amounts greater 
than $5400); ZACHARY ALBERT, TRENDS IN CAMPAIGN FINANCING, 1980–2016, at 18–19 (2017) 
(showing that the top 25% of individual donors gave 90% of campaign funds in 2016). 
88   This cap on individual contributions to regular PACs was established by the 1976 amendments to 
FECA, which were enacted in response to the Buckley decision.  See Federal Elections Campaign Act 
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 94-283, §112, 90 Stat. 475 (enacting 2 U.S.C. §441(a)(1)(C)).  
89  See Super PACS: How Many Donors Give, OPENSECRETS,  https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespend
ing/donor_stats.php?cycle=2016&type=I (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
90  MALBIN & GLAVIN, supra note 74, at 9. 
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by wealth gave more than $2.3 billion in 2015–2016, which was 45% more 
than the parallel group gave in 2012.91 
Thus, the changes initiated by Citizens United, and extended by 
SpeechNow.org, which enable individuals to give unlimited amounts to 
independent expenditure entities, have resulted in a dramatic increase in the 
overall amount contributed by individuals to such organizations.  One 
analysis has estimated that more than $1 billion of total federal election 
spending in the 2015–2016 cycle is attributable to changes in the law made 
by Citizens United and SpeechNow.org.92  Regardless of whether one finds these 
amounts troubling as a policy matter, they have created an electoral 
environment unimaginable to the Buckley Court.  Equally dramatic, the  
changes discussed have made it possible for a small number of extremely 
wealthy individuals to dominate outside spending vehicles.93  The potential 
dominance over specific races attributable to contributions from such a small 
number of donors may mark the greatest departure of the current electoral 
landscape from electoral politics at the time of Buckley. 
In addition to the impact of Citizens United and SpeechNow.org, the potential 
for greatly increased individual spending on behalf of traditional recipients 
of regulated contributions also may have occurred because of a change in the 
law regarding aggregate spending, although it is too soon to know what the 
actual effects of the change will be.  The legal change occurred when the 
Supreme Court ruled in McCutcheon v. FEC that Buckley-era caps on aggregate 
per-election-cycle spending cycle are unconstitutional.94  At the time of the 
Buckley decision, the aggregate contribution limit on individuals imposed by 
FECA was $25,000,95 or $105,451 in 2016 dollars.  As a result of the Court’s 
 
91  Sultan, supra note 16 (noting that the increase in number of individuals in 2016 was only three 
percent). 
92   See ADAM LIOZ, JUHEM NAVARRO-RIVERA & SEAN MCELWEE, DEMOS, COURT CASH: 2016 
ELECTION MONEY RESULTING DIRECTLY FROM SUPREME COURT RULINGS 2, 4, 7, 17 n.10 
(2017), available at http://www.demos.org/publication/court-cash-2016-election-money-resulting-
directly-supreme-court-rulings.   
93    Not all of these groups need to report all of the funds they raise or spend.  See What Super Pacs, Non-
Profits, and Other Groups Spending Outside Money Must Disclose About the Source and Use of Their Funds, 
OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/rules.php (last visited Apr. 5, 
2020).  Thus, the figures in the text outlining the concentration of wealthy donors are necessarily 
incomplete.  For outside spending, see infra Part I.C. 
94    McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 193 (2014). 
95    Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976) (per curiam).  The limit had already increased to $123,200 
by 2012.  McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 194; R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43334, 
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION LIMITS: SELECTED QUESTIONS ABOUT MCCUTCHEON AND POLICY 
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2 (2014). 
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invalidation of the aggregate contribution limit in McCutcheon, the maximum 
aggregate contribution limit per individual is now estimated to be $3,628,000 
in an election cycle, if the individual gives the maximum permitted to each 
federal candidate and entities associated with the candidates and parties.96  
In constant (2016) dollars, this is an increase of more than thirty times per 
individual contributor.  It is unlikely, however, that many, if any, individuals 
will spend the theoretical maximum this way.  Nevertheless, a watchdog 
group found that 646 individuals had given “at or near the overall limit” 
before McCutcheon was decided and, thus, that the increase in aggregate 
spending now permitted could enable high-wealth individuals to greatly 
magnify their influence on particular candidates.97   
In sum, wealthy individuals employing unlimited contribution vehicles 
now fund an enormous share of the spending in federal campaigns.  The 
implications for Buckley 2.0 are discussed in Parts II–III. 
C.  Outside Spending 
According to the Center for Responsive Politics, since Citizens United there 
has been “an explosion of election-related outside spending.”98  The term 
“outside spending” often refers to spending on elections by persons other 
than candidates, their campaigns, and political parties.99  The main examples 
 
96    McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 268 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
97  Bob Biersack, McCutcheon’s Multiplying Effect: Why an Overall Limit Matters, OPENSECRETS NEWS 
(Sept. 17, 2013, 11:38 PM), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/09/mccutcheons-
multiplying-effect-why. 
98  Roy Slatko, Politiquizz: Outside Spenders and the IRS, OPENSECRETS NEWS (Mar. 12, 2014, 1:00 PM), 
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/03/politiquizz-outside-spenders-and-th/. 
99    See, e.g., WESLEYAN MEDIA PROJECT & CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, SPECIAL REPORT ON 
OUTSIDE GROUP ACTIVITY, 2000–2016 (2016), http://mediaproject.wesleyan.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/DisclosureReport_FINAL-5.pdf; IAN VANDEWALKER, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUST., ELECTION SPENDING 2016: OUTSIDE GROUPS OUTSPEND CANDIDATES AND 
PARTIES IN KEY SENATE RACES (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/fi
les/publications/Election%20Spending%202016%20outside%20groups%20outspend.pdf.  Some 
authorities consider political party committees outside spending groups.  DAVID B. MAGLEBY, The 
2012 Election as a Team Sport, in FINANCING THE 2012 ELECTION 2 (2014).  Since some political 
party spending can be coordinated with candidates and some can be independent, parties may in 
fact be considered outside groups when their spending is independent of candidates.  See Making 
Independent Expenditures as A Political Party Committee, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-
committees/making-disbursements-political-party/making-independent-expenditures-political-pa
rty-committee (last visited May 17, 2020).  Some would not consider single-candidate Super PACs 
and Leadership Super PACS “outside.”  
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of such entities are exempt organizations described in a subsection of 501(c) 
of the IRC,100 section 527 organizations, and Super PACs.  Most 
organizations  described in  501(c) are social welfare organizations, labor 
groups, and trade associations and chambers of commerce.101  Together 
these groups and Super PACs are estimated to have spent between $1.5 and 
$1.8 billion in 2015–2016, which represents more than 20% of the roughly 
$6.5 billion spent on that election.102   This amount is almost 50% greater 
than the amount of outside spending in 2012.103  During the 2018 mid-term 
elections, outside spending was roughly $1.3 billion, which represented a 
60% increase over the previous mid-term election.104 
The term “outside spending” is intended to connote spending by groups 
or individuals that are independent of candidates.  In order to be entitled to 
receive contributions that are not capped by FECA contribution limits, the 
entities spending must be independent of candidates because the Supreme 
Court first justified unlimited spending by corporations using their corporate 
treasuries (instead of their PAC money) on the ground that there would be 
no possibility of campaign corruption as long as corporate expenditures were 
not coordinated with a candidate.105  One type of independent expenditure 
 
100  See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)–(6) (2018). 
101    See supra note 93.  
102   See Press Release, FEC, Statistical Summary of 24-Month Campaign Activity of the 2015–2016 
Election Cycle (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.fec.gov/updates/statistical-summary-24-month-
campaign-activity-2015-2016-election-cycle/ (showing that independent expenditure only political 
committees spent $1.8 billion in 2015–2016).  Other sources state that Super PACs spent 
$1,066,914,448 during that cycle in addition to more than $200 million spent by exempt 
organizations.  Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/
fes_summ.php?cycle=2016 (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).  The statistics do not reflect election spending 
not reported to the FEC, e.g., messages like electioneering communications broadcast outside the 
thirty- and sixty-day regulated periods. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.10(b)–(e) (2019); infra Part I.D.   
103    See Outside Spending in Elections, ISSUEONE, http://www.issueone.org/wp-content/uploads/2017
/09/outside-spending.pdf (last visited May 17, 2020).  Outside spending in 2012 accounted for 
16.5% of total election spending, while in 2016, it was 21.7%.  See id.  These amounts reflect only 
expenditures reported to the FEC.  Other election related spending by outside groups is not 
captured by these figures.  For parallel statistics that include spending by parties as outside spending, 
see WESLEYAN MEDIA PROJECT & CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, supra note 99.  
104    See Soo Rin Kim, Midterms Spending Overview: Total Expected to Reach $5.2 Billion, ABC NEWS (Nov. 6, 
2018), https://abcnews.go.com/beta-story-container/Politics/midterms-spending-overview-total-
cost-expected-reach-52/story?id=58996037. 
105    For a fuller account of Citizens United, its reasoning, and developments based upon that decision, see 
infra Part II.B.  This decision applies to union spending not funded by union PACs as well.  See What 
Citizens United Means for Union Political Spending, CTR. FOR UNION FACTS, 
https://www.unionfacts.com/article/political-money/what-citizens-united-means-for-union-
political-spending (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
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entity that arose in the wake of Citizens United and its progeny was the Super 
PAC, which is “super” because it is permitted to receive contributions not 
subject to FECA contribution limits as long as the Super PAC operates 
independently of candidates and their campaigns, as independence is defined 
in the regulations implementing FECA.106  It should be noted, however, that 
a significant portion of Super PACs are single-candidate Super PACs: their 
expenditures are made exclusively on behalf of a single candidate, although 
they do not coordinate their activities with that candidate, as coordination is 
defined by the FEC.  In 2012, roughly 42% of  Super PAC spending was 
attributable to single-candidate Super PACs; by 2016, half of Super PAC 
spending was attributable to them.107   
Is outside spending a bad thing?  Some have argued that outside money 
enables a wider range of voices to be heard during campaigns than was 
possible when candidates and party committees dominated campaign 
spending.108  That may be true, given that FEC reports indicate that the 
amount of outside spending has surpassed the amount of candidate spending 
in a growing number of races since 2008.109  However, who these newly 
 
106    On the FECA standard for independence, see infra Part II.B.5. 
107    In 2012, single-candidate Super PACS spent $273,479,098.  2012 Outside Spending by Single-Candidate 
Super PACs, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle
=2012&chrt=V&disp=O&type=C (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).  In 2012, total Super PAC spending 
was $609,936,792.  Outside Spending: Total by Type of Spender, 2012, OPENSECRETS, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/fes_summ.php?cycle=2012 (last visited Apr. 5, 
2020).  In 2016, single-candidate Super PACs spent over $530,000,000.  2016 Outside Spending by 
Single-Candidate Super PACs, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/su
mm.php?cycle=2016&chrt=V&disp=O&type=C (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).   
108    See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, Why the Media Hate Super PACs, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 6, 2015, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/11/campaign-finance-super-pacs/ (arguing that Super 
PACs allow citizens to speak to other citizens without interference); Bradley A. Smith, Citizens 
United Gives Freedom of Speech Back to the People, REUTERS (Jan. 16, 2015), http://blogs.re
uters.com/great-debate/2015/01/16/citizens-united-gives-freedom-of-speech-back-to-the-people 
(“Citizens United has made it far easier for challengers to compete with incumbents . . . .”). 
109    See Independent Spending Dominated the Closest Senate and House Races in 2016, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST. (Nov. 
10, 2016), http://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/16-11-10/independent_spending_dominated
_the_closest_senate_and_house_races_in_2016.aspx; Races in Which Outside Spending Exceeds 
Candidate Spending, 2018 Election Cycle, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outside
spending/outvscand.php?cycle=2018 (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) (listing twenty-eight House and 
Senate races in which outside spending exceeded candidate spending, sometimes by large 
percentages); see also VANDEWALKER, supra note 99 (arguing that outside groups spent more than 
both candidates and political parties combined in ten key Senate races).  OpenSecrets lists this data 
for election cycles going back to 2000, when there were zero such instances.  Races in Which Outside 
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empowered voices are, and whom or what they represent, is only partially 
known.  In the case of Super PACs, the names of individual donors are 
revealing, while some of the entity names are revealing, and others are not.  
Individuals, who are responsible for roughly two-thirds of the Super PAC 
receipts, can be identified using lists compiled by OpenSecrets.org and 
similar watchdog groups.110  In contrast, as was noted earlier, exempt 
organizations are given great latitude to engage in campaign activities,111 but 
they are not required to disclose their donors to the public.  In general, then, 
the origin of much of the hundreds of millions of dollars spent by outside 
groups cannot be identified.112  
It is impossible, therefore, to know if outside spending in fact makes 
possible the participation of a wide variety of voices that otherwise would not 
be heard or would not be heard effectively.  Based upon the fragmentary 
evidence available, it seems that much outside spending consists of voices 
already well represented in elections that are now greatly amplified by means 
of unlimited contributions that are pooled in independent spending vehicles.  
The same evidence shows that outside spending vehicles are increasingly 
dominated by mega-donations contributed by a small number of high-wealth 
individuals.113  It seems, then, that the rapid growth of outside spending 
coupled with the dominance of contributions by a tiny percentage of donors 
poses the risk that a handful of extremely wealthy people rather than citizens 
at large, or donors generally, will derive the benefit afforded by this new 
campaign finance phenomenon. 
D.  Issue Advocacy 
When Buckley was handed down, the art of creating issue ads to influence 
an election without being subject to regulation114 had not yet been refined, 
 
Spending Exceeds Candidate Spending, 2000 Election Cycle, OPENSECRETS, https://www.open
secrets.org/outsidespending/outvscand.php?cycle=2000. 
110  See 2018 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outside
spending/summ.php?cycle=2018&disp=D&type=V&superonly=N (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).  By 
clicking on the “Cycle” dropdown menu, donor data as far back as 2004 is available. 
111    See supra note 65. 
112  See Political Nonprofits (Dark Money), OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outside
spending/nonprof_summ.php (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) (showing the total amount of spending by 
groups with no disclosure of donors).  
113  See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
114  Some issue advertisements can also be subject to regulation under provisions of the Internal Revenue 
Code prohibiting or restricting political campaign activity engaged in by exempt organizations as 
well as through FECA regulation.  See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2006-1 C.B. 264; Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 
2007-25 I.R.B. 1421.  
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because the distinction Buckley drew between express advocacy and other 
campaign-related spending spawned the industry devoted to crafting 
electoral advertising ostensibly discussing issues rather than candidates.  An 
issue ad is a public communication addressing a subject of potential interest 
to the public, and it may be made to educate or persuade people about a 
subject, with or without the intent to influence their vote in an election.  For 
example, in order to persuade people to use reusable shopping bags, an 
environmental group may run ads informing the public that discarded plastic 
bags end up in rivers and kill fish who ingest too many of them.  
The Buckley Court emphasized that pure issue discussion enjoys the 
highest level of First Amendment protection because such discussion is 
critical for ensuring an informed public and because the First Amendment 
protects free expression to the greatest extent possible.  It ruled that 
communications during campaigns containing express advocacy could be 
subject to regulation by the FEC, but attempts to regulate other forms of 
speech during elections could pose a threat to the pure discussion of issues, 
especially when the difference between issue advocacy and campaign 
advocacy was unclear.115  After concluding that the FECA provision 
regulating expenditures would be unconstitutionally vague unless limited to 
express advocacy, the Buckley Court noted that adept lawyers would have no 
trouble authoring messages that evaded FECA restrictions, since all they had 
to do was avoid words of express advocacy, such as “elect” or “defeat” Joe 
Smith, or their equivalents.116  The Court was prescient, and in ensuing 
years, the phrase “sham issue advocacy” was coined to describe issue ads 
communicated with the intent to influence votes for candidates while evading 
FECA campaign restrictions imposed upon express advocacy, e.g., disclosure 
rules and rules requiring “hard” or PAC money to fund those 
communications.117  Using the plastic bag example, urging people to stop 
 
115  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976) (per curiam). 
116  Id. at 44 n.52.  Some commentators and courts have stated that few election ads contain express 
advocacy.  See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 127 (2003); BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., Magic 
Words, in STRAIGHT TALK ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE: SEPARATING FACT FROM FICTION (2009), 
available at https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/paper5.pdf.  However, 
FEC data indicate that, since Citizens United was decided, and probably because of it, the rate of 
spending on express advocacy has skyrocketed.  See Magleby, supra note 86, at 5 (stating that total 
reported independent expenditures in 2016 were $1,631,002,075). 
117  See Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of Contributions and Expenditures Funding 
Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. REV. 265 (2000); BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, EXPRESS 
ADVOCACY AND ISSUE ADVOCACY: HISTORICAL AND LEGAL EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL 
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using plastic bags because of the environmental harm is pure issue advocacy.  
A similar ad broadcast near an election that also notes which candidates 
support or oppose a “bag tax” may be intended to influence how people vote 
in that election, but it would not be subject to regulation, despite its 
motivation, because it lacks words explicitly calling for the election or defeat 
of a candidate.  
In 2002, Congress sought to curb the unregulated funding of issue ads 
likely aimed at influencing voters’ choice of candidates by amending FECA 
to include a new category of campaign speech called “electioneering 
communications.”  The new category was defined to include 
communications using broadcast media (but not print or mail) that mention 
or otherwise refer to a specific federal candidate and that are made in the 
thirty days before a primary or sixty days before an election, if the ads target 
at least 50,000 members of the relevant electorate for that candidate.118  The 
new provisions compelled the disclosure of the amounts and sources of 
electioneering communications and, if the funders of the communications 
were corporations or labor unions, the provisions required them to use PAC 
funds to pay for the ads.119  
The electioneering provisions were upheld against a constitutional 
challenge in McConnell v. FEC.120  However, in 2007, the Supreme Court 
revised and narrowed the definition of an electioneering communication for 
purposes of the ban on corporate funding so that it included little more than 
express advocacy.121  In 2010, Citizens United held that corporations and 
unions could use general treasury funds to pay for express advocacy and 
electioneering communications as long as the communications were not 
coordinated with a candidate or campaign.122  The result of Citizens United 
was thus to further undermine BCRA’s electioneering communication 
provision, thereby restoring corporations’ ability to spend potentially 
unlimited amounts on issue ads intended to influence voting for specific 
candidates, even if they explicitly refer to  candidates and are broadcast on 
 
ADVERTISING 23–25, www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_106
67.pdf (last accessed Apr. 5, 2020). 
118  52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3) (2018). 
119  The provision was part of a larger campaign finance reform effort.  See Part I.A.2. 
120  McConnell, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
121  See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (holding that the ban  could only apply to 
electioneering communications that were the functional equivalent of express advocacy).  But see 
infra note 123 and accompanying text. 
122  See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360–65 (2010).  
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the eve of primaries and elections, as long as the corporations do not 
coordinate with the candidates or their campaigns.  
The amounts spent on issue ads intended to influence the election of 
candidates is difficult to capture since such spending is not in general 
disclosed in public records.  However, Wisconsin Right to Life and Citizens United 
left undisturbed the disclosure rules pertaining to the original definition of 
electioneering communications; as a result, individuals and groups that fund 
issue ads mentioning or otherwise identifying a candidate in the period 
shortly before a primary or election must continue to report such 
expenditures to the FEC.123   In that event, the identities of individuals and 
groups who directly finance such communications would become public, as 
would the amounts they give for that purpose.  However, since the definition 
does not include ads in print media, mail, or social media (even in the period 
shortly before a primary or election) and it only covers broadcast advertising 
during that time frame,124 most election-related issue advocacy will not need 
to be disclosed.  Thus, most amounts spent on issue ads targeted to influence 
elections but not subject to reporting as independent expenditures cannot be 
known with any precision.125  Spending on issue ads in the 1997–1998 
congressional election cycle has been estimated at between $135 million and 
$150 million.126  The Annenberg Public Policy Center estimated that $509 
million was spent on broadcast issue ads alone in 2000.127  In 2010, according 
to OpenSecrets.org, tax-exempt social welfare organizations spent $127 
million on ads and other electoral activities, and they spent $308 million in 
2012.128  They are not, however, in general required to reveal the identities 
 
123  See id. at 368–71.   
124  See supra note 25. 
125  For a detailed discussion of disclosure rules that apply to certain issue advertisements, see generally 
What Super PACs, Non-Profits, and Other Groups Spending Money Must Disclose About the Source and Use of 
Their Funds, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrests.org/outsidespending/rules.php (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2020). 
126  Jeffrey D. Stanger & Douglas G. Rivlin, Issue Advocacy Advertising During the 1997–1998 Election Cycle, 
ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y CTR. (1998), http://library.law.columbia.edu/urlmirror/CLR/
100CLR620/report.htm. 
127  JOSEPH E. CANTOR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REP. NO. 97-91, SOFT AND HARD MONEY IN 
CONTEMPORARY ELECTIONS: WHAT FEDERAL LAW DOES AND DOES NOT REGULATE 5 (Mar. 
15, 2002).  
128  The 10 Things They Won’t Tell You About Money-in-Politics, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensec
rets.org/resources/10things/03.php (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).  Organizations exempt under 
section 501(c)(4)–(6) of the Internal Revenue Code can engage in various kinds of campaign activity as 
long as such activity (combined with other activities not components of their exempt purpose) does 
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of their contributors, and even when they make required disclosures for 
independent expenditures, they may not be required to disclose the identities 
of donors unless the donors earmark their contributions specifically for 
reportable expenditures.129  Similarly, figures for “political ad” spending are 
not helpful because they include numerous kinds of campaign advertising 
other than issue advocacy intended to influence votes on candidates.130 
In short, although there may have been campaign-oriented issue 
advocacy at the time Buckley was litigated, there are no precise (or even 
imprecise) estimates of the amounts spent on such activity then.  Similarly, it 
is impossible to quantify such issue advocacy today.  Because outside group 
spending has skyrocketed since Citizens United, and much spending by outside 
groups appears to be campaign-oriented, the phenomenon of campaign ads 
masquerading as issue advocacy, which Buckley predicted,131 has contributed 
to record campaign spending by commercial and non-commercial interests, 
whether funded by individuals or groups. 
E.  Conclusion 
 Hard data relating to many contemporary campaign practices are 
difficult or impossible to obtain, largely because of the absence of disclosure 
requirements in existing law, but also because of stratagems adopted by those 
who wish to influence the outcome of elections by injecting massive amounts 
of money while remaining invisible.  Despite this, as this Part has shown, 
there is an abundance of evidence that there has been rapid growth in the 
amount of campaign spending attributable to business interests and more 
massive increases in the amounts spent by individuals, some of whom spend 
millions or tens of millions of dollars to influence the outcome of federal 
campaigns.  These changes have profound implications for policymakers and 
lawmakers that are beyond the scope of the present analysis. These changes 
may also have consequences for the application of the legal doctrines and 
reasoning set forth in the Buckley decision more than forty years ago.  It is the 
 
not become their primary activity.  See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2) (exempting organizations 
that operate exclusively for the social welfare). 
129  See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text.  For reporting of contributions funding their 
electioneering communications, see supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.  
130  See, e.g., Megan Janetsky, Low Transparency, Low Regulation Online Political Ads Skyrocket, OPENSECRETS 
(Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2018/03/low-transparency-low-regulation-
online-political-ads-skyrocket/ (summarizing spending on both broadcast and online 
advertisements since 2010). 
131  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976) (per curiam). 
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latter concerns that Parts II–III and the Buckley 2.0 thought experiment 
address.   
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE DOCTRINE 
The main issues discussed in Buckley were limits on campaign 
contributions, limits on independent expenditures, aggregate limits, public 
financing, and the creation and operation of the FEC.132  Although much 
could be said about all of these subjects,133 Buckley 2.0 will focus on the first 
two, which constitute the largest part of the campaign finance discussion 
today.  
A.  Contributions to Candidates 
The contribution question in Buckley was whether the newly enacted 
$1000 cap on contributions to candidates and their campaign committees 
was constitutional.134  The challengers argued that the caps impermissibly 
burdened their freedom of speech and especially their freedom of political 
expression.135   The Supreme Court upheld the limits.  It reasoned, first, that 
the burden on individuals limited to contributions to candidates of $1000 per 
primary and an additional $1000 in the general election was real but “only a 
marginal restriction” on their free speech and, second, that the government 
interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption was “a 
constitutionally sufficient justification” for imposing this burden.136  The 
Court considered the limit a marginal restriction for two reasons.  First, it 
viewed contributions as symbolic speech137 since they show general support 
for a candidate, but do not translate directly into an expression of support for 
 
132  Id. at 7. 
133  See generally Liz Kennedy & Seth Katsuya Endo, The World According to, and After McCutcheon v. 
FEC, and Why It Matters, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 533 (2015) (discussing the impact of McCutcheon and 
the significance of aggregate contribution limits); Note, Eliminating the FEC: The Best Hope for Campaign 
Finance Regulation?, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1421 (2018) (analyzing the FEC’s weaknesses and arguing 
that it should be eliminated rather than reformed). 
134  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23.  The cap also applied to contributions to intermediaries if earmarked for 
candidates.  Id. at 24.  
135  Id. at 11, 14–15.  
136  Id. at 20–21, 26–27. 
137  Id. at 21. 
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specific views or reasons.138  A candidate can, for example, use contributed 
funds for ads or activities relating to issues not important to the donor; thus, 
the political expression funded would be a choice made by the recipient of 
the money rather than the donor.  The highest degree of First Amendment 
protection goes to the donor’s own speech rather than that of the recipient of 
the donor’s largesse.139  Buckley also stated that contribution limits are a 
marginal burden because they do not “in any way infringe the contributor’s 
freedom to discuss candidates and issues,”140 since contributors can still make 
independent expenditures, join political groups, and volunteer to advance 
their political views.141 
One question Buckley 2.0 would consider today is whether the current 
limit on individuals’ contributions to candidates is unconstitutionally small.  
The maximum contribution to a candidate at the time of Buckley was $1000 
per primary or election,142 which would be $4486 for each in 2016 dollars. 
The maximum that individuals could contribute to a candidate in a primary 
or a general election in 2015–2016 was $2700,143 or roughly 60% of the 
Buckley era inflation-adjusted amount.  Current contribution limits have not 
kept pace with the Buckley-era limits because Congress did not initially peg 
them to inflation.  It was not until 2002 that Congress increased the 
maximum individual contribution to candidates for primaries and elections 
from $1000 to $2000 and also provided for an inflation adjustment to that 
amount by election cycle.144 
The $1000 limit on contributions was challenged in the original Buckley 
as unconstitutional because larger contributions would not raise the threat of 
corruption, which was the government’s justification for imposing the 
limits.145  The Court first responded that Congress could constitutionally 
conclude that some limit is necessary to avoid corruption or its 
 
138  See id. at 21 (noting that a contribution indicates support for a candidate, but without 
“communicat[ing] the underlying basis for the support”). 
139  See id. at 21 (stating that contributions involve “speech by someone other than the contributor”). 
140  Id. at 21. 
141  Id. at 22. 
142  FECA Amendments of 1974, Pub. L No. 93-443, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 1263 (1974). 
143  Contribution Limits for 2015–2016, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/updates/contribution-limits-for-
2015-2016 (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).  Individuals can give additional amounts to federal PACs, 
national party committees, and state, district, or local party committees.  See Contribution Limits, FEC, 
https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/contribution-li
mits/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
144  BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 307(a), (d), 116 Stat. 81 (2002).  
145  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976) (per curiam). 
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appearance.146  It then conceded that Congress could have created a different 
standard, but held that its failure to do so did not make the provision invalid 
as long as the limit chosen was narrowly tailored to prevent the harm 
described.147  The Court also quoted with approval the appellate court’s 
statement that it is not for a court to decide whether the limit should be $2000 
or $1000, once Congress found that some limit was necessary to avoid 
corruption or its appearance.148  For the Buckley Court, the test was whether 
the contribution limits “prevented candidates and political committees from 
amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.”149  All candidates 
need sufficient resources, but the effective advocacy standard is especially 
critical for challengers who hope to replace incumbents but are hampered 
because of the many tangible and intangible benefits of incumbency their 
opponents enjoy.150  The Buckley Court exhibited an attitude of deference to 
the legislature’s judgments when it upheld the $1000 limit, explaining that 
the limit would not have “any dramatic adverse effect” on raising campaign 
funds, and it indicated that Congress was free to choose $1000 rather than 
$2000 since the former did not preclude effective advocacy by candidates.151   
Buckley 2.0 would apply the effective advocacy test of the original Buckley 
to assess the validity of the contribution cap for individuals ($2,700 for each 
primary and election in 2015–2016), which will be adjusted for inflation 
regularly.152  It would likely start by reviewing judicial decisions since Buckley 
that addressed challenges to contribution caps.  The most recent and relevant 
such case, Randall v. Sorrell,153 itself summarized the history of state and federal 
challenges to contribution limits.  It noted that “the Court has consistently 
 
146  Id. at 27–28. 
147  Id. at 30, 33. 
148  Id. at 30 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). 
149  Id. at 21.  The Buckley Court found that the plaintiff had failed to produce evidence that contribution 
limits “in themselves” discriminate unfairly between challengers and incumbents.  Id. at 32. 
150  Id. at 31 n.33.  See also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402–04 (2000) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (describing some benefits enjoyed by incumbents); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 
248–49 (2006) (plurality opinion) (discussing the role of contribution caps in limiting the incumbent 
advantage). 
151  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 34–35. 
152  See Contribution Limits, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidate-
taking-receipts/contribution-limits (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).  The cap is $2,800 per election, per 
candidate, for 2019–2020.   
153  Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006). 
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upheld contribution limits.”154  At the same time, even cases upholding 
contribution limits have cautioned that low limits can have the effect of 
making it difficult for challengers to challenge incumbents successfully.155 
In Randall, which examined Vermont’s contribution limits relating to 
several state-wide offices, the Court held that the restrictions were 
unconstitutional.  It emphasized that its ruling did not rest exclusively on the 
low dollar limits of $200–$400, depending upon the office; rather, the state 
had also imposed severe restraints on political parties and volunteers.156   
Further, the dollar limits were not indexed for inflation.157  Thus, the Court 
suspended its usual deference to lawmakers’ assessments of what is necessary 
to avoid the threat of corruption or its appearance when very low dollar limits 
were combined with associated campaign constraints in such a way as to 
make effective advocacy difficult.  
Buckley 2.0 would certainly apply the doctrinal norms these cases reflect 
to the empirical reality of contemporary campaign funding.  For example, 
the Court would note the total cost of elections as well as the cost of 
congressional and presidential contests separately.  Adjusted for inflation, the 
cost of presidential contests has not necessarily increased each election 
cycle.158  In contrast, the cost of congressional races in constant dollars has 
more than doubled since 2000.159   
Several watchdog groups and nonpartisan organizations have gathered 
and analyzed data about the sources of campaign contributions and the 
characteristics of donors that would aid the Court in reaching a decision.  In 
 
154  Id. at 247 (first citing Nixon, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); then citing Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 
(1981)). 
155  Id. at 248–49. 
156  Id. at 253.  The Vermont contribution caps were “the lowest in the Nation,” id. at 250, and they 
were a small fraction of the limits approved in Buckley, almost thirty years earlier.  Id. at 250–51.  In 
addition, the statute required volunteers to treat their expenses as contributions, id. at 259–60, 
which could severely restrict how much volunteering people could do if they incurred such things 
as transportation costs. 
157  Id. at 252. 
158  See Cost of Election, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/cost.php?display=T&
infl=Y (compiling the cost of total, presidential, and congressional elections from 1998–2018).  All 
spending (in inflation adjusted dollars), including PAC spending, was $2,053,679,582 in 2000, 
$2,539,322,657 in 2004, $3,230,405,854 in 2008, $2,859,684,723 in 2012, and $2,495,740,931 in 
2016.  The 2016 figures, which were lower than expected, were explained by the free publicity 
given to Donald J. Trump, see infra note 298, although the 2012 total was almost $400 million less 
than the 2008 total. 
159  See id. (showing that spending on congressional races was $2,498,050,032 in 2000 and 
$5,725,183,133 in 2018). 
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the last three presidential election cycles, there were wide variations in the 
percentage of total contributions to candidates for all offices that were small 
($200 or less) or larger, up to the election or election cycle limit.160  Buckley 
2.0 would undoubtedly note the dramatic increase in the number of 
individual contributors to federal campaigns,161 while the inflation-adjusted 
average contribution per individual has decreased.162  This suggests that 
current contribution limits have not discouraged participation by individuals 
in elections, which was a concern of Buckley.163  In fact, internet platforms 
that comply with FEC contribution regulations, like ActBlue, have facilitated 
the growth of small- and medium-sized donations to candidates.164  
Because many sources aggregate a donor’s contributions to candidates, 
parties, and other recipients, it is difficult to determine whether $2700 or 
$5400 per candidate per election cycle (or $2,800 for 2019–2020) is too low, 
since it may be only one piece of a donor’s giving.  As was true when the 
original Buckley was decided, donors can also give to party committees of 
 
160  See MALBIN & GLAVIN, supra note 74, at 31–33  (showing individual contributions to all presidential 
candidates in primaries); id. at 41 (showing individual contributions to general election presidential 
candidates); id. at 13–14, 61–62 (showing individual contributions to House and Senate candidates).  
The statistics for congressional candidates are less revealing because contributions of $1000 or more 
are not further subdivided.  For example, in 2012, roughly 50% of Mitt Romney’s receipts from 
individuals were less than the $2500 cap in that election cycle, compared with 78% for Barack 
Obama.  Id.; CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION TO GENERAL ELECTION 
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, AGGREGATED BY DONORS, FULL TWO-YEAR CYCLES, 2008–2016  
http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/federal/2016Report/pdf/CFI_Federal-CF_16_Table1-08.pdf (last 
accessed May 17, 2020). 
161  See PERSILY, BAUER & GINSBERG, supra note 85, at 22 (noting that 3.2 million people made 
contributions to federal campaigns in 2016 compared to roughly 66,000 in 1982); See ALBERT, supra 
note 87, at 17 (noting that the number of individual contributors increased 487% during this 
period).  
162  See ALBERT, supra note 87, at 17 (noting that the average total contribution from each individual 
“has declined sharply since 1982” and that the average individual contribution was less in 2016 
than in any election since 1982).  The figures are direct contributions from individuals to all 
candidates per election, and not to each candidate.  Id. 
163  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28–29, 36 (1976) (per curiam). 
164  In the 2018 non-presidential election cycle, ActBlue, which raises money for federal, state, and local 
Democratic candidates and organizations, raised roughly $1.7 billion. See 2018 Election Cycle in 
Review, ACTBLUE, https://report.actblue.com (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). This was roughly double 
the amount ActBlue had raised in the 2016 presidential election cycle.  Id.  Almost 64% of donors 
on ActBlue in 2018 were first-time donors to ActBlue, and their contributions were 37% of the 
money raised on the platform.  See id.  ActBlue classifies contributions of more than $200 as large 
contributions.  See ActBlue Contributors, 2018 Cycle, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/
pacs/pacgave2.php?cmte=C00401224&cycle=2018 (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
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various kinds,165 in addition to outside groups such as PACs, Super PACs, 
and exempt organizations.  As a consequence, whether the limits on 
contributions to candidates are large enough to make possible effective 
advocacy by candidates cannot be determined in a vacuum, i.e., without 
reference to other campaign rules, including those that have emerged since 
the original Buckley.  Among other things, Buckley 2.0 would review the 
holdings in Citizens United and McCutcheon before reaching a conclusion about 
the constitutionality of the limits on contributions by individuals to 
candidates, measured by effective advocacy.   
The original Buckley had expressed the view that independent spending 
on behalf of a candidate by third parties could be significantly less helpful to 
the candidate than the candidate’s own spending and that outside spending 
could even undermine or otherwise harm the candidate’s message.166  Buckley 
2.0 might, then, view the huge sums of outside spending in recent elections167 
as a threat to a candidate’s effective advocacy.  In that event, the Court could 
find caps on contributions by individuals to candidates too low in the current 
campaign finance environment to enable candidates themselves to raise 
enough money to control their campaigns’ messages.  It would note that in 
some races, the amount of outside spending exceeds the amount of spending 
by the candidate.168  Alternatively, Buckley 2.0 might conclude that many 
Super PACs, especially single-candidate Super PACs, are “outside” groups 
in name only since the alleged barrier between the group and the candidate 
is so porous that much, if not most, single-candidate Super PAC spending 
will clearly supplement or be the equivalent of candidate spending.169   
Buckley 2.0’s final conclusion regarding individual contribution 
limitations, then, must await its assessment of other aspects of the 
contemporary electoral landscape, both empirical and doctrinal.170  For the 
present, Buckley 2.0 would likely conclude that pre-McCutcheon aggregate 
limits had the effect of depressing the amounts individuals could give to 
multiple candidates because the aggregate cap created a zero-sum game in 
which giving the maximum contribution to nine candidates would make it 
 
165  See Contribution Limits, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidate-
taking-receipts/contribution-limits (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
166  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47. 
167  See supra Part I.C. 
168  See supra note 109. 
169  See infra notes 239–43, 306 and accompanying text. 
170  For example, the statistics quoted for the 2015–2016 election cycle may reflect the impact of 
McCutcheon, which removed aggregate caps per election.  Buckley 2.0 also envisions the implications 
for effective advocacy if Citizens United and SpeechNow.org were no longer good law. 
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impossible to contribute to others.  In that event, taking into account the 
failure of contribution limits for individuals to keep pace with inflation, the 
rate of increase in the cost of campaigns, and the ability of outside spending 
to overwhelm candidate spending, Buckley 2.0 could well find the pre-
McCutcheon limits on individual contributions to candidates unconstitutionally 
small, despite its acknowledged deference to Congress regarding appropriate 
restrictions to guard against corruption or its appearance.  The reason would 
be that the original Buckley also established effective advocacy as an 
independent principle guiding its deliberations.  Such a finding would not 
necessarily require Buckley 2.0 to endorse McCutcheon, but it would likely 
constitute an important factor in the Court’s assessment of McCutcheon.  By 
the same token, if Buckley 2.0 were to find the McCutcheon decision valid in 
light of contemporary campaign practices, it would likely leave intact the 
current rates coupled with FECA’s formula for raising dollar amounts on a 
regular basis.  
B.  Contributions to Independent Spending Groups 
The original Buckley invalidated FECA’s limits on independent 
expenditures, that is, amounts spent by individuals and entities on expressly 
advocating the election or defeat of specific candidates for federal office.171  
Although it did not consider contributions to independent expenditure 
groups, which did not exist at that time, the Buckley decision would inform 
Buckley 2.0’s analysis of this practice through its reasoning about the 
relationship between the threat of corruption and the character of 
independent actors. 
1.  The Genesis of Unlimited Contributions to Independent Spending Groups 
Unlimited donations to independent spending groups were authorized by 
SpeechNow.org, an appellate court decision handed down in 2010.172  The D.C. 
Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court’s assertion in Citizens United that 
independent corporate spending could never give rise to corruption or the 
appearance of corruption and extended that holding to contributions made 
 
171  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16–20. 
172  See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding that the government 
violated the First Amendment by setting campaign contribution limits for independent expenditure-
only groups like SpeechNow).  
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by individuals or groups to independent spending entities.173  Some courts 
and commentators have challenged SpeechNow.org’s holding.174  The Supreme 
Court, however, has never reviewed the decision or the central issue.175 
In Citizens United, the Court challenged the FECA provision requiring 
corporations, unions, and certain other institutions to fund their campaign 
contributions and their independent expenditures with money amassed in 
PACs rather than with general revenues derived from their business (treasury 
funds).176  The restrictions imposed by FECA on raising PAC money meant 
that these entities would likely have less to spend on campaign activities than 
would have been available from their treasury funds.  The Citizens United 
Court concluded that the rules prohibiting campaign spending from treasury 
funds were unconstitutional if corporations or unions act independently of 
candidates because independent action precludes the possibility of 
corruption, which can only exist if there is a quid pro quo arrangement 
between candidates and those who act on their behalf.177  In short, absent 
coordination, there is no quid pro quo; absent quid pro quo, there is no 
possibility of corruption. 
The same year, the appellate court in SpeechNow.org held that it was 
unconstitutional for the government to cap contributions that individuals and 
others make to organizations involved in campaigns, if the recipient 
 
173  SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 692–95. 
174  See Albert W. Alschuler et al., Why Limits on Contributions to Super PACs Should Survive Citizens United, 
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2299, 2299 (2018) (arguing that the D.C. Circuit’s decision in SpeechNow.org 
“created a regime in which contributions to candidates are limited but in which contributions to 
less responsible groups urging votes for these candidates are unbounded” and that “the judgment 
that the Constitution requires [this system of campaign financing] is astonishing . . . .  Contrary to 
the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning, contributions to super PACs can corrupt even when expenditures by 
these groups do not”); Albert W. Alschuler, Limiting Political Contributions after McCutcheon, Citizens 
United, and SpeechNow, 67 FLA. L. REV. 389, 471–77 (2015) (arguing that the SpeechNow court 
relied on dictum from the Citzens United opinion and that the D.C. Circuit “should have focused on 
Buckley’s holding that limits on contributions to official election campaigns are permissible and 
should have asked whether limits on contributions to super PACs can reasonably be treated 
differently”);  see also Richard L. Hasen, Super PAC Contributions, Corruption, and the Proxy War Over 
Coordination, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 15 (2014) (stating that “the arguments for 
individual contribution limits applied to candidate campaign accounts and to single-candidate 
reliable Super PACs appear to be very close to each other and roughly similar in strength”).  For 
courts that have resisted the holding, see Alschuler et al., supra, at 2308–09, 2311.  
175  Hasen, supra note 174, at 11. 
176  The plaintiffs in Citizens United originally challenged the constitutionality of the electioneering 
communication as applied to them; however, the Court initiated the larger issue and had the case 
re-briefed.  See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 321–22 (2010).  
177  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360–61. 
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organizations act independently of candidates and their campaigns.178   The 
SpeechNow.org court argued that, in Citizens United, the Supreme Court held 
that “the government has no anti-corruption interest in limiting independent 
expenditures.”179  As the SpeechNow.org court noted, to reach its conclusion, 
Citizens United relied upon the observation made in Buckley that the absence 
of coordination between a candidate and someone spending money to help 
the candidate “alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid 
pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”180  “Alleviates,” 
however, means reduces; it does not mean precludes or prevents.  Therefore, 
the Buckley Court added the further observation that advocacy funded by 
independent expenditures “does not presently appear to pose dangers of real 
or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign 
contributions.”181  The implication of “presently” is that it is in principle 
possible that independent spending could at some time come to pose a 
danger of real or apparent corruption equal to that of large contributions.  
Noting this implication, the SpeechNow.org court pointed out that the Supreme 
Court, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, had stated in a footnote that 
Congress might present evidence that independent corporate expenditures 
on behalf of a candidate could present “a danger of real or apparent 
corruption,”182 even though Bellotti also held that—because the litigation 
concerned a ballot initiative rather than an election involving candidates 
potentially subject to corruption—no such danger existed in the case before 
it.183  The SpeechNow.org court also mentioned two subsequent decisions by 
the Supreme Court that upheld laws designed to prevent corruption 
associated with independent corporate spending.184 
 
178  SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 693–96.  
179  Id. at 693. 
180  Id. (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357).  The result would be the same if the money was spent to 
defeat a candidate’s opponent. 
181  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46; see also SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 693 (using “diminishes” to refer to the 
Buckley Court’s caveat).  
182  First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978). 
183  SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 693–94 (noting that in Bellotti, the Supreme Court “struck down a state-
law prohibition on corporate independent expenditures related to referenda”).  The observation 
was in a footnote, but it was dictum in any event because the case challenged a law preventing 
corporations spending general funds to influence a ballot initiative, not the election of a candidate. 
184  Id. at 694 (referring to Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654–55 (1990), as upholding 
a state prohibition on corporate independent expenditures, and McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 
203–09 (2003), as upholding the federal prohibition on corporate expenditures for electioneering 
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Despite these precedents suggesting that independent expenditures could 
pose the threat of corruption, the SpeechNow.org court, following Citizens 
United, stated that Congress had no interest at all in limiting contributions by 
the plaintiff groups in its own case because Citizens United had held as “a 
matter of law” that independent expenditures could never pose a threat of 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.185  In addition, the SpeechNow.org 
court noted that Citizens United had asserted that corruption means quid pro 
quo corruption for campaign finance purposes and, further, that quid pro 
quo means agreement by one party to do something specific for another 
party in exchange for financial or other support by the other party on the 
first party’s behalf.186   
The SpeechNow.org court traced the history of Supreme Court decisions 
elaborating a broader understanding of corruption than the understanding 
advanced by Citizens United, namely, the view that corruption includes 
gaining influence with or access to an official, in addition to obtaining a 
specific benefit.  Citizens United rejected the broader understanding in favor 
of a narrow definition that implies the impossibility of independent 
expenditures corrupting as a matter of law.187  The SpeechNow.org court then 
concluded that, based upon this position of Citizens United, the government 
could have no interest in regulating independent electoral spending by 
independent expenditure groups, and it extended this conclusion further to 
hold that contributions by individuals to independent expenditure 
organizations could not be limited because there was zero threat of 
corruption to balance against the fundamental interest of political speech in 
the form of contributions to such organizations.188  The SpeechNow.org 
decision thus articulated as a constitutional right unlimited giving to electoral 
entities as long as those entities operate independently of candidates for 
public office. 
 
communications, enacted in 2002).  Austin was overturned by Citizens United, which also invalidated 
parts of McConnell. 
185  SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 694–95; see also Douglas M. Spencer & Abby K. Wood, Citizens United, 
States Divided: An Empirical Analysis of Independent Political Spending, 89 IND. L.J. 315, 318–19 (2014) 
(calling Citizens United’s assertion a “legal fiction” that reveals the Court’s complete indifference to 
what actually causes corruption as an empirical matter in favor of a blanket assertion without 
evidentiary support). 
186  SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 694. 
187  Id. (“The fact that speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that 
these officials are corrupt.”) (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357–59 (2010)). 
188  Id. at 695 (stating that “the First Amendment cannot be encroached upon for naught”). 
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Buckley 2.0 would evaluate these developments with the benefit of 
hindsight.  In particular, in addition to applying the doctrines it set forth in 
the original Buckley opinion to contemporary electoral practices, it would 
have almost a decade of history with which to assess the impact of Citizens 
United and SpeechNow.org on those practices.  Since the original Buckley 
repeatedly used statistics to support its arguments, it is reasonable to assume 
that Buckley 2.0 would also consider empirical evidence in reaching its 
conclusions today. 
2.  Buckley 2.0’s Analysis of Unlimited Contributions and the Threat of 
Corruption: New Facts on the Ground 
There are several areas in which Buckley 2.0 reaches a different conclusion 
than the court reached in SpeechNow.org.  The first of these is the SpeechNow.org 
court’s conclusion that the government’s interest in regulating contributions 
to independent spending groups is a “naught” because independent or 
uncoordinated spending simply does not pose a threat of corruption or the 
appearance of corruption.189   
Buckley 2.0 would identify significant problems with this reasoning.  As 
has been noted by several constitutional law scholars, it does not follow 
logically from the fact that groups are themselves engaged in independent 
spending—and, thus, may pose no threat of corruption, using the Citizens 
United definition—that contributions to these groups by individuals or other 
entities also pose no threat of corruption or the appearance of corruption.190  
The fallacy, they argue, is the failure to recognize that “[i]t is the six-, seven-, 
and eight-figure donations to super PACs that create the appearance (and 
likely the reality) of corruption, not the groups’ expenditures” because 
ordinary people recognize that office holders reward with legislation or other 
favors those who write the large checks, not the recipient groups.191  For 
 
189  SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 693–95. 
190  See Alschuler et al., supra note 174, at 2308–12 (arguing that “super PAC contributions can corrupt 
even when these groups’ expenditures do not” and referencing recent cases in which federal courts 
have “rejected the SpeechNow syllogism”). 
191  See id. at 2311–12 (emphasis added).  They mention as examples sugar subsidies, tax provisions, and 
arms deals that Congress has approved, even when agency staff opposed such acts of favoritism.  Id.  
They also argue that if the independence of a recipient organization necessarily precluded or 
cleansed possible corruption taint associated with donors to independent spending groups, there 
would be no reason to have laws barring contributions by government contractors or foreign 
persons.  Id.; see also Hasen, supra note 174, at 6–10; Alschuler, supra note 174, at 80–82 (arguing 
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example, in the eight years after Citizens United was decided, a mere eleven 
donors contributed more than $1 billion to Super PACs, which was 20% of 
all the money raised by those groups during that time.192  The largest donor 
gave almost $78 million to Republican candidates in 2016, which included 
$20 million to a single candidate running for President.193   
Buckley 2.0 would assess empirically the proposition that contributions to 
Super PACs or other independent expenditure groups cannot lead to 
corruption or the appearance of corruption by taking into account the 
extraordinary size of such contributions.  Super PACs, dark money groups 
that receive certain earmarked contributions, and section 527 organizations 
all are required to disclose the names of their donors and the amounts of their 
donations, which then become a matter of public record.194  For example, 
the 100 contributors of the largest amounts to outside groups in each election 
cycle are listed on OpenSecrets.org.195  Since roughly half of Super PACs in 
2015–2016 were single-candidate organizations,196 candidates could easily 
know, for example, which individuals or entities each contributed millions of 
 
that the holding in Caperton is incompatible with saying that the government’s interest in 
independent expenditures is zero, even though Justice Kennedy claimed there was a difference 
between the two situations). 
192  Michelle Ye Hee Lee, One-Fifth of All Super-PAC Money, from Just Eleven Pockets, WASH. POST, Oct. 
27, 2018, at A14; see also supra notes 89–90 (documenting the small number of donors responsible 
for two-thirds or more of contributions to Super PACs). 
193  Lee, supra note 192.  The constitutional scholars cited above also argue that Citizens United’s claim 
that independent spending poses no threat of corruption as a matter of law was actually dictum in 
the case, since it was unnecessary to reach a decision in the case after the Court concluded that “the 
First Amendment prohibits ‘restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech 
by some but not by others.’”  Alschuler et al., supra note 174, at 2312–13 (quoting Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010), which was paraphrasing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765, 784 (1978)).  The authors also argue that the Court resolved the case a second time when it 
stated that only quid pro quo corruption counts as corruption.  Id. 
194  See Jeffrey D. Stanger & Douglas G. Rivlin, Issue Advocacy Advertising During the 1997–1998 Election 
Cycle, ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y CTR. (1998), http://library.law.columbia.edu/urlmirror/
CLR/100CLR620/report.htm.  However, earmarked contributions are rarely reported.  See Lee, 
supra note 192 (noting that “[w]hile donors to super PACs are disclosed, public filings do not reflect 
contributions to politically active nonprofit groups that are not required to reveal their donors.”). 
195  2018 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/out
sidespending/summ.php?cycle=2018&disp=D&type=V&superonly=N (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).  
The names listed are of individuals.  As was noted earlier, the names of groups can be unrevealing 
(at least to the public).  The OpenSecrets website cautions that the lists are incomplete because most 
501(c)(4) groups do not reveal the identities of their donors or the amounts given.  Id.  The FEC’s 
website enables the public to search a candidate’s donors.  See Individual Contributions, FEC, 
https://www.fec.gov/data/receipts/individual-contributions/?two_year_transaction_period=202
0&min_date=01%2F01%2F2019&max_date=12%2F31%2F2020 (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
196  See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
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dollars to support them or defeat their opponents.  Even in the case of dark 
money groups that do not disclose their donors to the public, candidates are 
likely to know which individuals and entities are contributing huge amounts 
because, although such groups cannot coordinate their activities with 
candidates, no law prohibits them from disclosing to candidates the names of 
their donors and the amounts donated, if they choose.  Thus, the public is in 
the dark; but the beneficiary candidates may not be. 
In 2008, the last election before Citizens United was decided, only three 
individuals and four entities gave sums in excess of $1 million to outside 
groups.197  Regardless of whether the Supreme Court’s claim that 
independent spending could pose no threat of corruption was accurate at 
that time, the explosion of unlimited spending in the decade after Citizens 
United makes that assumption no longer tenable.  For example, it is easy to 
link one donor’s $20 million contribution to Donald Trump’s campaign to 
various actions the Trump Administration has taken that were specifically 
requested by that donor.198   Although there is probably no way to prove the 
actual impact of huge campaign contributions on a recipient,199 in many 
instances the appearance of a connection seems obvious. 
 
197  2008 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/
outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2008&disp=D&type=V&superonly=N (last visited Apr. 6, 
2020) (showing individuals’ funding of outside groups); 2008 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups, 
OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2008&disp=D
&type=O&superonly=N (last visited Apr. 6, 2020) (showing organizations’ funding of outside 
groups). 
198  See Jeremy W. Peters, Sheldon Adelson Sees a Lot to Like in Trump’s Washington, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/22/us/politics/adelson-trump-republican-donor.ht
ml.  For example, the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and decision to move the U.S. 
Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, both urged by Adelson, occurred even before other Trump 
campaign promises were acted upon, such as moving forward on building a wall between the 
United States and Mexico, which had energized the vast majority of Trump’s most ardent 
supporters.  The timing suggests that the priority President Trump gave to the two Israel decisions, 
if not the inclination to make them in the first place, can be traced to the Adelson’s campaign 
contributions and  influence.  Trump also acted quickly on tax cuts favoring the wealthy over the 
middle class, which arguably reflected the influence of large donors to his campaign. 
199  Some argue that those who donate huge sums do so because the candidate already is committed to 
the policies the donor favors.  See Jake J. Smith, When Corporations Donate to Candidates, Are They Buying 
Influence?, KELLOGG INSIGHT (Sept. 5, 2017), https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/do-
corporate-campaign-contributions-buy-influence (referencing research on corporate campaign 
contributions suggesting “that donations do not buy meaningful political favors”).  While 
undoubtedly true in some cases, it is hard not to believe that huge campaign contributions will not 
affect the priority the recipient assigns to his or her campaign promises.  See Hasen, supra note 174, 
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In short, when assessing the proposition that independent expenditures 
preclude a threat of corruption as a matter of law, Buckley 2.0 would take into 
account new facts on the ground, namely, the vast sums injected into 
campaigns on an ostensibly independent basis.  These are facts that did not 
exist in 2010 and that the Justices making that decision may well not have 
anticipated.  Buckley 2.0 would ask whether at some point what begins as a 
matter of degree becomes a matter of kind.  Buckley 2.0 would also question 
whether the emergence of single-candidate independent expenditure Super 
PACs, responsible for almost two-thirds of a billion dollars in the 2015–2016 
election cycle alone and accounting for an increasingly large percentage of 
total campaign spending, indicates that the formal independence of 
expenditures can no longer be presumed to alleviate the threat of corruption.  
Finally, focusing specifically on the holding of SpeechNow.org, Buckley 2.0 would 
find that nothing in the law prevents the contributors to independent 
expenditure groups from coordinating with candidates, even if the groups 
themselves cannot.200  
3.  Buckley 2.0’s Analysis of the Meaning of Corruption and Quid Pro Quo 
In addition to reviewing the impact of unlimited giving on the original 
Buckley’s assumption that independent spending is unlikely to pose a threat of 
corruption, Buckley 2.0 would certainly take issue with the definition of 
corruption assumed by SpeechNow.org, based upon Citizens United, i.e., that 
corruption refers exclusively to quid pro quo corruption, and not 
“[i]ngratiation and access.”201  This interpretation of quid pro quo 
corruption, Buckley 2.0 would point out, misstates what the original Buckley 
said.  When Buckley identified corruption with “political quid pro quo’s,” it cited 
as support the opinion of the Court of Appeals below and expressly cited 
 
at 4 (opining that many large donors seek to ensure a candidate will support measures the donor 
desires). 
200  SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 694–95; supra notes 178–79  and accompanying text (describing the legal 
standard, which depends upon the independence of the recipient organizations and not on any 
characteristics of the contributors); infra note 306 and accompanying text (describing an FEC 
Advisory Opinion permitting candidates to speak at and solicit contributions at fundraising events 
held by independent expenditure entities).  
201  SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 694 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010)).  On the 
changes in the meaning of corruption in Supreme Court opinions, see Trevor Potter, The Court’s 
Changing Concept of Corruption, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (May 7, 2015), https://campaignlegal.org/
update/courts-changing-conception-corruption. 
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footnotes in that decision summarizing parts of the record.202  Both the 
appellate Buckley opinion and the footnotes cited there characterized quid pro 
quo situations in terms of influence as well as bribery.  In addition to 
describing the problem campaign finance law was addressing as “undue 
influence,”203 the appellate court included among illustrative examples large 
contributions made “in order to gain a meeting with White House officials” 
and testimony that donors were “motivated by the perception that this . . . 
would get us in the door and make our point of view heard.”204  To the same 
effect, the original Buckley mentions “improper influence,” “undue 
influence,” “the “appearance of impropriety,” and “buy[ing] influence” 
repeatedly to describe the evils that Congress sought to counter with FECA, 
which suggests that the Court saw FECA as addressing problems beyond 
bribery or specific trades of money for concrete favors.205  Further, the 
original Buckley explicitly rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the law’s 
contribution limits were unconstitutional because bribery laws and disclosure 
requirements were a less restrictive means of treating quid pro quo 
arrangements.206  The Buckley Court countered that “giving and taking of 
bribes deal with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with 
money to influence governmental action,”207 implying that “corruption” in 
the campaign finance context covers less blatant and specific attempts to 
affect official actions and policies. 
Buckley 2.0 might also observe that Citizens United appears to understand 
corruption as discrete transactions in which contributors exchange donations 
 
202  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27, n.28 (1976) (per curiam) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 
821, 839–40 & nn. 36–38 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). 
203  Buckley, 519 F.2d at 840.  
204  Id. at 840 & nn. 36–37.  The footnotes cited by the Buckley Court also mentioned large donors who 
saw their contributions as necessary “to be actively considered” for ambassadorships.  Id. at n.38.  
205  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27, 30, 45, 53, 58, 76; id. at 256–57 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part) 
(characterizing the aim of FECA as countering “the risk of undue influence”); id. at 260–61 
(referring to the aim of contribution limits as “preventing undue influence” and “improper[] 
influence”) (White, J., concurring in part); see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, 447–52 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part) (four Justice opinion) (describing the history of Supreme Court decisions prior 
to Citizens United that understood corruption as including influence and access). 
206  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27–28. 
207  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28; see also Alschuler, supra note 174, at 466 (arguing that Buckley’s use of quid 
pro quo occurred fifteen years before the Supreme Court first used quid pro quo in a bribery case); 
id. at 468–69 (discussing Supreme Court decisions after Buckley that used quid pro quo to cover 
situations involving undue influence). 
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for specific acts by office holders,208 whereas for the original Buckley, “the 
impact of the appearance of corruption stem[s] from public awareness of the 
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial 
contributions.”209  The notion of “a regime” of large contributions and the 
threat of “abuse inherent” in such a regime refers to more than occasional 
discrete acts of bribery; it suggests a climate in which the influence of those 
who make large contributions is pervasive.  Thus, Buckley 2.0 would likely 
reject the claims of Citizens United that the “fact that speakers may have 
influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that these officials 
are corrupt” and that favoritism by representatives is the equivalent of 
legitimate responsiveness, not corruption,210 because the Citizens United Court 
disregarded the original Buckley opinion and its broader understanding of 
corruption.   
The original Buckley’s interpretation of the scope of quid pro quo 
corruption is consistent with, indeed part and parcel of, the original Buckley’s 
concern with preserving “the integrity of our system of representative 
democracy.”211  For the initial Buckley, corruption was problematic because 
it threatened the integrity of representative government.  Eliminating 
corruption was thus a means to a more foundational end, the integrity of the 
electoral system that ensures that the U.S. government will be truly 
representative.  In fact, Buckley 2.0 might well diagnose the main error of 
Citizens United as the later Court’s attempt to reduce Buckley’s focus on the 
integrity of the American electoral system to a single threat to its integrity, 
namely, quid pro quo corruption, and a narrow version of quid pro quo 
corruption at that.  The original Buckley had a much broader view of potential 
threats to the government’s integrity.  If integrity is the end, and elimination 
of corruption is a means, then curbing the influence of big contributions on 
the decision-making of public officials is a compelling interest because their 
decisions should be guided by some vision of the public interest and 
deliberation. 
In sum, Buckley 2.0 would find that Citizens United could not legitimately 
cite Buckley as the basis for its holding because quid pro quo meant something 
 
208  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359–61 (distinguishing quid pro quo corruption from ingratiation 
and favoritism, which it equates with responsiveness to constituents). 
209  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27. 
210  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359.  Citizens United quotes Justice Kennedy’s opinion in McConnell as 
well, id., but fails to note that Justice Kennedy was concurring in part with the decision’s holding 
and with its reasoning.  The portion quoted forms part of Justice Kennedy’s disagreement with the 
McConnell majority.   
211  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–27. 
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more expansive for Buckley than the meaning adopted by Citizens United.  Had 
Citizens United recognized that the actual meaning of quid pro quo for the 
Buckley Court included influence or access, it would have confronted two 
choices.  Either it would have acknowledged the need to overturn this aspect 
of Buckley explicitly, or alternatively, it would have realized the necessity of 
providing an independent justification for its claim that giving access and 
influence cannot constitute corruption as a matter of law, based upon 
considerations other than precedent.212  Absent such a justification or explicit 
rejection of Buckley, Citizens United’s claim about the meaning of quid pro quo 
has no foundation other than an interpretive mistake.  Buckley 2.0 would thus 
reject this aspect of Citizens United, which, in turn, would further weaken the 
claim that independent expenditures cannot pose a threat of corruption as a 
matter of law. 
4.  Buckley 2.0’s Analysis of the Appearance of Corruption 
Justice Kennedy stated in Citizens United that “[t]he appearance of 
influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in 
our democracy.”213  His support for his assertion is the further assertion that 
“ingratiation and access . . . are not corruption” as a matter of law214 and the 
dictum that “it is our law and our tradition that more speech, not less, is the 
governing rule.”215 
Buckley 2.0 would observe that when the original Buckley stated that the 
appearance of corruption is “of almost equal concern” as the actuality of 
corruption, it immediately linked the appearance of corruption to “public 
awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large 
 
212  The Citizens United majority did rely on other precedents, but they were dissents in decisions where 
the majority opinion construed quid pro quo more broadly.  There were numerous precedents in 
majority opinions, in contrast, supporting the Buckley majority’s view.  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. 
at 447-51 (Stevens, J.) (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
213  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46). 
214  Justice Kennedy adds that the fact that corporations make independent expenditures itself 
acknowledges “the ultimate influence” of voters.  Id.  Justice Kennedy’s comment does not prove 
what he thinks it does.  The fact that donors fund independent expenditures to get a candidate 
elected or re-elected is wholly consistent with the donors’ hope that the candidate, once elected, 
will be grateful and thus influenced in his agenda or official actions by the donors’ wishes.  
Candidates, in turn, want to continue to inspire their large donors’ generosity in future elections 
and, thus, have an additional reason to please them while in office.  
215  Id. at 361. 
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individual financial contributions.”216  The original Buckley reasoned that 
“Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance 
of improper influence ‘is also critical . . . if confidence in the system of 
representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.’”217  
The original Buckley thus agreed with Citizens United that preserving citizens’ 
trust or faith in their government is the underlying issue, but it disagreed with 
the latter decision about what causes citizens to lose trust or confidence in 
government.  Further, the original Buckley specifically identified “the 
appearance of improper influence” as a significant threat to confidence in 
representative democracy justifying certain campaign finance regulations.218  
These statements are evidence that the original Buckley interpreted the 
appearance of corruption to include an ordinary person’s predictable 
reaction to oversize contributions, i.e., that they would influence, even if they 
did not completely determine, a recipient’s decision-making.  
In addition, the Buckley approach reflects FECA’s legislative history, in 
which lawmakers expressly linked contribution limits to the problem of 
influence and indebtedness, not just to bargains struck.219  Although Citizens 
United also recognized that the touchstone of the integrity of government is 
citizens’ trust in the system,220 the Court seemed to assume that the 
appearance of corruption is inextricably connected to bribery—as, in its 
view, corruption is—as though public impressions of the influence of wealth 
on the agendas and attitudes of lawmakers short of bribery were of no legal 
consequence for the question of appearances.  
In point of fact, empirical analysis shows otherwise.  Buckley 2.0 would 
bolster its interpretation of the original Buckley by citing numerous studies 
showing that ordinary citizens equate gaining influence or buying access with 
corruption.221   It is thus consistent with both the Supreme Court’s own 
 
216 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27; see also supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text.   
217  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (quoting U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers AFL-
CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)). 
218  Id. at 27 (emphasis added). 
219  See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 291 (1971) (statement of Sen. Chiles) (emphasizing the need for measures 
to “restore public confidence” in “the elective process”); Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Commc’ns of the S. Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong. 542 (1971) (statement of Sen. 
Frank E. Moss) (noting the “widespread cynicism” traceable to the “vast influence” of big 
contributors). 
220  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360. 
221  See, e.g., Liz Kennedy, Citizens Actually United: The Overwhelming Bi-Partisan Opposition to Corporate 
Political Spending and Support for Achievable Reforms, DEMOS (Oct. 25, 2012), https://www.dem
os.org/policy-briefs/citizens-actually-united-bi-partisan-opposition-corporate-political-spending-a
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precedents and empirical data to have a capacious definition of corruption 
in “the appearance of corruption,” even if corruption per se is construed 
narrowly.  In short, the question of appearances cannot be decided as a 
matter of law.222  Thus, even if Buckley 2.0 did not contest Citizens United’s 
definition of corruption, it would likely reject that Court’s narrow definition 
of the appearance of corruption when evaluating Congress’s attempt to enact 
reforms addressing threats to citizens’ trust in government owing to the 
appearance of corruption. 
Buckley 2.0’s likely conclusion concerning the appearance of corruption 
can be traced to the specific concern articulated by Buckley and subsequent 
decisions, namely, that people’s “confidence in the system of representative 
[g]overnment,” i.e., the “integrity of our system,” will be undermined by 
seeing large contributors obtaining special access to or favors from public 
officials.223  Although some commentators have argued that large 
contributions are more often motivated by candidates’ policies than the 
reverse,224 the vast majority of ordinary voters see large donations as 
corrupting influences because they assume that large contributors have a 
disproportionate voice over legislation and public policies.225  Representative 
government, in contrast to other forms of democracy, presupposes the 
 
nd (finding that 85% “call it corruption when financial supporters have more access and influence 
with members of Congress than average Americans”); Christopher Robertson et al., The Appearance 
and the Reality of Quid Pro Quo Corruption: An Empirical Investigation, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 375 (2016) 
(finding support, based upon a simulated grand jury and a representative online petit jury, for the 
position that contributions intended to influence a public official to support favorable legislation 
creates the appearance of corruption, even though the contributions are made to an independent 
entity that supports the official’s reelection); Molly J. Walker Wilson, Financing Elections and 
“Appearance of Corruption”: Citizen Attitudes and Behavior, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 953, 980 (2014) (citing 
survey data); see also Ben Jacobs & David Smith, ‘Politics Are Corrupt’: Fears About Money and its Influence 
on Elections Loom Large, GUARDIAN (Jul. 8, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2016/jul/08/trump-clinton-sanders-super-pacs-election-money (noting that in the months leading 
up to the 2016 presidential elections, individuals “raised [the issue of campaign finance reform] as 
one of their main concerns”); William Alan Nelson II, Buying the Electorate: An Empirical Study of the 
Current Campaign Finance Landscape and How the Supreme Court Erred in Not Revisiting Citizens United, 61 
CLEV. ST.  L. REV. 443, 463–64 (2013) (citing multiple polls from 2010 in which a large majority 
of respondents agreed “that there should be limits on corporate political spending” and expressed 
opposition to the Citizens United decision); Rebecca L. Brown & Andrew D. Martin, Rhetoric and 
Reality: Testing the Harm of Campaign Spending, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1066, 1071–72  (2015) (describing 
how “large infusions of money into campaigns have the effect of causing the electorate to lose faith” 
in their representatives).  
222 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.   
223  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–27. 
224  See, e.g., supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
225  See, e.g., supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
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responsiveness of lawmakers to citizens in general, and not just to elites or 
interest groups.  Although no individual or group can expect that its views 
will necessarily carry the day and be translated into government action, it is 
reasonable for them to believe that their views will be taken seriously and 
receive meaningful consideration and that the wishes of the majority of 
citizens will not be routinely disregarded in favor of the agendas of large 
contributors.  If, ex ante, the views of donors of huge sums of money will 
determine legislative outcomes and executive actions, the resulting system 
does not deserve the label “representative.”  In short, Buckley 2.0 would justify 
its interpretation on the perceptions of ordinary citizens because the original 
Buckley and the concept of representative democracy both require this.  It 
would thus reject Citizens United’s narrowing of the “appearance of 
corruption” for purposes of constitutional analysis both because it contradicts 
the original Buckley and because it ignores the necessarily experiential basis 
of what constitutes appearances.   
5.  Buckley 2.0’s Analysis of the Independence of Contemporary Independent 
Expenditures  
Citizens United invalidated existing statutory restrictions on corporate 
spending using general business revenues in situations where corporations 
are engaged in independent spending.226  In contrast, if their ostensibly 
independent spending is in fact coordinated with a candidate or a candidate’s 
campaign, Citizens United left unchanged the FECA provision that re-
characterizes the amounts involved as contributions to a candidate and, thus, 
makes them subject to contribution limits.227  
The original Buckley, which protected independent expenditures from 
limits enacted by Congress in 1971, involved independent spending by 
individuals or groups.  As stated by the original Buckley, the reason Congress 
cannot constitutionally limit the amounts spent on independent expenditures 
is that such spending does not pose a threat of corruption because such 
spending is not controlled by a candidate and, thus, might be used in ways 
viewed by the candidate as unhelpful or even harmful.228  As a consequence, 
 
226  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365.  Parallel rules apply to unions.  See supra note 32. 
227  See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B) (2018) (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 
46; 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(b) (2019).  For the limited effectiveness of this rule, see infra notes 232–44 
and accompanying text. 
228  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47. 
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the candidate would not necessarily feel indebted to or under an obligation 
to please the persons responsible for independent spending. 
In taking this position, the Buckley Court was not naive; it conditioned its 
holding on the independent spending being “totally” independent.229  
Otherwise the inference from the candidate’s lack of control and potential 
for harm would not be warranted.  Further, it noted that independent 
spending did “not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent 
corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign 
contributions,”230 thereby making clear that the Court did not rule out, as a 
matter of law or otherwise, the possibility that independent spending could 
at some time pose such a threat.  For Buckley, independent spending was to 
be protected because of “its substantially diminished potential for abuse.”231  
The task for Buckley 2.0, therefore, is to examine whether the threat posed by 
independent spending as practiced in the current environment is as 
diminished as it was in 1976 or, in the alternative, independent spending now 
poses a threat of abuse.  Depending upon the result, Buckley 2.0’s inquiry 
could affect independent spending by individuals as well as by corporations 
and other business interests, with ramifications for the constitutional status of 
unlimited contributions to independent expenditure groups as well. 
FECA does not define “independent” or its opposite, “coordinated”; 
rather the terms are defined in FECA regulations.232  Initially, the FEC’s 
implementing regulations defined coordination in terms of a candidate 
engaging in “substantial discussion or negotiation” with a third party that 
resulted in “collaboration or agreement.”233  In 2001, Congress rejected that 
interpretation as too weak, and it directed the FEC to promulgate regulations 
covering a much wider range of interactions between candidates and third 
parties supporting their campaigns with allegedly independent spending.234  
 
229  Id. 
230  Id. at 46.  Cf. Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243, 246 (2010) (arguing that 
Buckley adopted the absurd view that “independent expenditures are not at all” corrupting). 
231  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47. 
232  11 C.F.R. § 109.20(a) (2019) (defining “coordinated” as “cooperation, consultation or concert with, 
or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate’s authorized committee, or a political 
party committee”).  
233  Shays v. FEC (Shays I), 337 F. Supp. 2d 28, 55–56 & n.25 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005).  
234  See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(ii) (2018); Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Pub. L. No.107-
155, § 214(c), 116 Stat. 81, 94 (2002).  
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The resulting new coordination regulations were successfully challenged in 
court twice for being too permissive to satisfy the Congressional mandate.235   
That the current regulations are still too permissive has been noted by 
reformers and members of both political parties because they do not classify 
as “coordinated” many communications that would be considered 
coordinated “under any common sense definition.”236  Some aspects of the 
definition are vague.  For example, communications made by an individual 
or group may only be considered coordinated if a candidate or staff member 
is “materially involved in decisions regarding the communications,”237 with 
uncertain application of standards to determine materiality.238  In addition, 
the rules themselves are often lax: they permit independent expenditure 
entities to hire the same vendors, such as pollsters and advertising companies, 
as the candidate uses, as long as a “firewall” is created between those in the 
company representing the candidate and those representing the independent 
expenditure entity.239  Moreover, a firewall is not necessarily mandatory: the 
FEC approved an exempt organization with both a traditional PAC and an 
 
235  The history of this litigation is described in Shays v. FEC, 528 F.3d 914, 918–22 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  
236  See Campaign Legal Center & Democracy 21, Comment Letter on Commission’s Notice 2014-12 
on Earmarking, Affiliation, Joint Fundraising, Disclosure, and Other Issues (McCutcheon), at 19 (Jan. 
15, 2015), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=312983; see also, e.g., Brent Ferguson, 
Beyond Coordination: Defining Indirect Campaign Contributions for the Super PAC Era, 42 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 471, 524 (2015) (describing the nature of indirect contributions and the difficulty in defining 
them “given the lack of direct guidance from the Supreme Court”); see also Bradley A. Smith, Super 
PACs and the Role of “Coordination” in Campaign Finance Law, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 603, 605–06 
(2013) (quoting but disagreeing with lawmakers, academics, and party officials who deny the 
independence of independent entities like Super PACs); Public Citizen, Comment Letter on Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking 2010-01 on Coordinated Communications, at 4 (Feb. 24, 2010), 
https://www.fec.gov/resources/legal-resources/rulemakings/nprm/coord_commun/2009/publ
ic_citizen.pdf (stating that there are “crippling weaknesses inherent in the 2007 coordination rule”). 
237  11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(2), (3) (2019).  If the information in question was obtained from a publicly 
available source, however, coordination has not occurred.  Id. § 109.21(d)(3).   
238  According to the FEC, “‘material’ has its ordinary legal meaning, which is ‘important; more or less 
necessary; having influence or effect; going to the merits.’ . . . The term ‘material’ is included to 
safeguard against the inclusion of incidental participation that is not important to, or does not 
influence, decisions regarding a communication.”  Material Involvement, 68 Fed. Reg. 434 (Jan. 3, 
2003) (codified at 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(2)) (citing Material, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 
1990)). 
239  11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(4), (5) (2019); see also Ashley Balcerzak, Candidates and Their Super PACs Sharing 
Vendors More Than Ever, OPENSECRETS (Dec. 21, 2016, 3:25 PM), https://www.opensecrets.org/
news/2016/12/candidates-super-pacs-share-vendors/; Idrees Kahloon, Outside Groups, Presidential 
Committees Share Staff and Vendors, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Aug. 7, 2015, 12:01 AM), 
https://sunlightfoundation.com/2015/08/07/super-pacs-presidential-committees-share-staff-and
-vendors/; Note, Working Together for An Independent Expenditure: Candidate Assistance with Super PAC 
Fundraising, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1478, 1485–86 (2015). 
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independent expenditure Super PAC, even though the same individual was 
President of the exempt organization and Treasurer of both PACs, based 
upon the organization’s simple representation to the FEC that the Super 
PAC would not engage in any coordinated activities.240  Further, not 
infrequently, a member of a lawmaker’s staff resigns from his or her staff 
position before an election and then establishes and operates an independent 
expenditure entity, even a single-candidate Super PAC, to help elect or re-
elect the lawmaker,241 bringing along a reservoir of inside information.  One 
commentator has opined that a candidate’s spouse can buy advertising 
urging the election of the candidate without violating the coordination rules 
as long as they do not “discuss[] the details of specific ad buys.”242  Again, 
communications made in public are exempted from the definition of 
coordination, so candidates or their surrogates can, for example, state openly 
when interviewed on radio or television a campaign’s “wish list” for 
additional advertising or get-out-the-vote efforts in specific locations.243  For 
these and other reasons, the coordination rules have been repeatedly 
criticized for failing to ensure genuine independence.  The lack of 
 
240  FEC, ADVISORY OPINION 2010-09, at 4 (2010), available at https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/
aos/2010-09/AO-2010-09.pdf (finding that the President’s “overlap of duties” would not 
“compromise” the Super PAC’s independence because of the representations made by the 
organization). 
241  For specific examples, see Richard Briffault, Coordination Reconsidered, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 
88, 90–91 (2013); see also FEC, ADVISORY OPINION 2016-21, at 3–7 (2017), available at 
https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/2016-21/2016-21.pdf (discussing several situations in which 
a candidate’s or party’s former employee joins a hybrid PAC and concluding that the use of 
information acquired in previous position will be coordinated if it is material). 
242  Paul S. Ryan, Two Faulty Assumptions of Citizens United and How to Limit the Damage, 44 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 583, 586 (2013).  Although the quoted statement may be an exaggeration, because the 
standard would be the materiality of the information transmitted, not specificity, nonetheless the 
less specific the information in question, the harder it would be to prove its materiality. 
243  See, e.g., Alex Roarty et al., They’re Not Allowed to Talk. But Candidates and PACs Are Brazenly 
Communicating All the Time, ATLANTIC (Oct. 30, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/po
litics/archive/2014/10/theyre-not-allowed-to-talk-but-candidates-and-pacs-are-brazenly-commu
nicating-all-the-time/435771/; Briffault, supra note 241, at 94.  Cf. Kenneth P. Doyle, FEC Drops 
Illegal Coordination Charges Against McGinty Campaign, BLOOMBERG LAW (Dec. 19, 2016, 3:34 PM) 
(describing FEC’s decision to drop coordination charges against a Pennsylvania Senate candidate).  
But see Complaint, Campaign Legal Center v. VoteVets (F.E.C. filed Feb. 18, 2020), available at 
https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/02-18-20%20VoteVets%20Buttigieg%20
%28final%20signed%29.pdf (arguing that there is no public communication exception if the public 
communications were at the request or suggestion of the candidate or his campaign). 
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enforcement also contributes to the problem, and the FEC has rarely found 
an ostensibly independent activity to be coordinated.244 
In light of these provisions and practices, Buckley 2.0 would conclude that 
what satisfies the legal definition of independence is not in fact “totally” 
independent as originally understood by Buckley in 1976.  Such a finding 
would force Buckley 2.0 to assess, first, whether the absence of meaningful 
independence today is a sufficient reason for reversing Citizens United’s 
decision to allow corporations to fund independent spending with general 
treasury revenues and, second, whether SpeechNow.org’s extension of that 
ruling to contributions to independent spending groups remains valid.  These 
questions are examined in the next Part. 
III.  WOULD THE BUCKLEY COURT OVERRULE CITIZENS UNITED AND 
SPEECHNOW.ORG? 
Buckley 2.0 will thus be forced to consider whether the time has come to 
overrule Citizens United, which will have the concomitant effect of invalidating 
SpeechNow.org insofar as it relies on the reasoning of Citizens United regarding 
the relationship between independent expenditures and corruption. 
A.  Principles Governing the Protection of Speech During Elections 
In contemplating such a consequential action, Buckley 2.0 would first 
review the principles grounding the original Buckley decision.  These are that: 
1. The First Amendment affords a very high degree of protection to both 
political expression and political association.245 
2. Neither of these protected rights is absolute.  As stated in the original 
Buckley, “[e]ven a ‘significant interference’ with protected rights of 
political association” may at times be justified.246 
3. Government restrictions on these rights must be subject to exacting 
scrutiny.247 
 
244  See Rachael Marcus & John Dunbar, Rules Against Coordination Between Super PACs, Candidates, Tough 
to Enforce, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 19, 2014, 12:19 PM), https://public
integrity.org/federal-politics/rules-against-coordination-between-super-pacs-candidates-tough-to-
enforce (relating criticism of current enforcement of coordination rules). 
245  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1976) (per curiam). 
246  Id. at 25 (quoting U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 
548, 567 (1973)) (“Neither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is 
absolute”).   
247  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16.  Buckley uses the standard of “exacting scrutiny” in connection with limits 
on independent expenditures, id. at 44–45, and disclosure regulations.  Id. at 64.  Buckley adopts 
“the closest scrutiny” when upholding contribution limits.  Id. at 25 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 
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4. Exacting scrutiny requires the Court to assess the importance of the 
government’s interest in regulating campaign speech and the 
relationship between the government’s interest and the means chosen to 
effectuate that interest.248 
5. The interest of the government in regulating campaign contributions is 
primarily to prevent corruption of candidates and office holders deriving 
from the influence of large outlays because corruption undermines the 
integrity of the system of representative government.249 
6. The interest of the government in regulating campaign contributions is 
also to prevent the appearance of corruption in the eyes of the citizens 
because confidence in elected officials’ integrity when acting in their 
official capacity is also essential to the integrity of the system of 
representative government and a primary goal.250 
7. Although preventing corruption and its appearance are the primary 
justifications for FECA’s restrictions on campaign contributions, 
nothing in the original Buckley precludes Congress taking additional 
steps to protect the integrity of the system of representative government 
if they satisfy exacting scrutiny.251  For example, electoral integrity also 
depends upon an informed electorate.252  Both the protection of political 
speech and disclosure rules are justified for the sake of facilitating an 
informed electorate. 
8. The ability of candidates to have sufficient resources for effective 
advocacy is another condition of the integrity of representative 
government and, thus, the means that governments select to address 
corruption, its appearance, an informed electorate, confidence in 
elected officials, or other conditions of the integrity of representative 
government should not obstruct the possibility of effective advocacy by 
candidates for election or re-election.253  
9. It is inconsistent with the First Amendment to restrict the speech of some 
to assure that citizens at large have equal resources to make their voices 
heard.254 
Buckley 2.0 would then examine, in light of these principles and current 
campaign practices, the reasoning presented in Citizens United to justify its 
 
357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958)) (“In view of the fundamental nature of the right to associate, 
governmental ‘action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to 
the closest scrutiny.”).  
248  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64–65. 
249  Id. at 26–27.  
250  Id. at 25–26;  see also id. at 67. 
251  Id. 14–15, 49 n.55; see also id. at 26 (referring to corruption and its appearance as FECA’s primary 
purpose, not its exclusive purpose); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978). 
252  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68 (referring to Congress’ goals of “curbing the evils of campaign ignorance 
and corruption”). 
253  Id. at 21–22. 
254  Id. at 48–49. 
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conclusion that it is unconstitutional to prevent corporations and unions from 
using general treasury funds for advocating the election or defeat of 
candidates when these entities do not coordinate with candidates or their 
campaigns. 
B.  Citizens United’s Claim that Corporations Have General Political Speech Rights 
1.  Buckley’s Silence Concerning Corporate and Union Rights  
Citizens United asserted that the restrictions on corporations and unions 
spending general treasury funds “could not have been squared with the 
reasoning of [Buckley],”255 based largely on inferences Citizens United drew 
from what Buckley failed to say.  For example, according to Citizens United, 
when Buckley invalidated FECA’s limits on independent expenditures, it did 
not make an exception for corporations and unions engaging in independent 
spending; therefore, Buckley must have assumed these entities would be 
making independent expenditures along with individuals and other groups 
and, thus, it must have implicitly approved such activities.256  
As a matter of logic, however, a court’s silence on a subject does not in 
general show that it endorses every possible inference based upon what it did 
not address in a decision.  This is especially true in a system such as ours, 
where judges are limited to adjudicating cases or controversies.257  Buckley 2.0 
would explain that, as Citizens United itself noted,258 FECA’s prohibition on 
corporate and union independent expenditures financed through general 
treasury funds was not an issue in the original Buckley.  Buckley 2.0 would reject 
Citizens United’s assertion of Buckley’s implicit teaching because the Court was 
not asked to nor did it consider the application of independent expenditure 
rules to commercial corporations and unions.  Thus, Buckley’s conclusion that 
independent expenditures “do[] not presently appear to pose dangers of real 
or apparent corruption” like large contributions do was reached without 
evidence presented as to the impact of campaign spending by commercial 
corporations or unions.259  
Second, Citizens United supported its claim as to Buckley’s implicit teaching 
by observing that “some of the prevailing plaintiffs in Buckley were 
 
255  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 346 (2010). 
256  Id. at 346. 
257  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
258  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 346.   
259  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46. 
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corporations.”260  Buckley 2.0 would respond that the corporate plaintiffs in 
the original Buckley were “political committees” under FECA or nonprofit 
advocacy organizations like the New York Civil Liberties Union.261  Buckley 
2.0 would note that political committees were already subject to FECA’s 
fundraising and disclosure rules, so they could not use treasury funds for 
political spending anyway.  The other corporate plaintiffs in the case were 
advocacy organizations, not commercial enterprises, so their sources of funds 
were largely donations or dues, not business revenues. 
Buckley 2.0 would thus conclude that the original Buckley had not 
examined the question of independent expenditures made by corporations 
or unions from their general treasury funds.  Accordingly, Citizens United’s 
inferences from its silence or from the fact that some plaintiffs were 
corporations did not support Citizens United’s conclusion that Buckley was 
precedent for the proposition that commercial corporations and unions have 
general political speech rights. 
2.  Citizens United’s Argument Based Upon Bellotti 
Citizens United asserted that Buckley stood for the “principle that the 
Government cannot restrict political speech based on the speaker’s corporate 
identity.”262  It buttressed this claim by turning to First National Bank of Boston 
v. Bellotti, which invalidated a state ban on corporations funding independent 
expenditures.263  Bellotti considered a Massachusetts statute banning 
contributions or expenditures by corporations and other business entities 
during a ballot initiative relating to a state-sponsored proposal to introduce 
a graduated income tax.  The Bellotti Court emphasized that the challenged 
statute threatened to prevent the airing of a point of view that might not 
otherwise be represented during the debate over the proposed legislation, in 
particular, the viewpoint of business interests opposed to Massachusetts’ 
position endorsing the ballot initiative.264  In expressing its concern about the 
 
260  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 346. 
261  According to Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7–8, the plaintiffs were three individuals and seven organizations. 
The organizations were political parties, nonprofits, and advocacy groups.  Id.  
262  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 346. 
263  Id. at 340 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978). 
264  The Court thus seems to have viewed this as a case of viewpoint discrimination, because the 
Government sought to silence the view of business entities who opposed the state’s proposed tax 
reform.  But see Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 347 (asserting that Bellotti was not about viewpoint 
discrimination). 
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government using its legislative power to suppress opposition to its position, 
the Bellotti Court said that the First Amendment does not permit the 
government to prevent a class of speakers from contributing to the discussion 
of a public issue.265  
In reviewing Citizens United’s reliance upon Bellotti for the proposition that 
the First Amendment categorically bars the government from preventing a 
class of speakers from engaging in political speech, Buckley 2.0 would observe 
that neither the Bellotti holding nor its reasoning claimed to invalidate 
regulation of corporate political speech as a general matter.  Rather, the 
Bellotti Court explicitly distinguished the government’s interest in preventing 
corruption in a ballot initiative from other situations, noting that its 
“consideration of a corporation’s right to speak on issues of general public 
interest implies no comparable right in the quite different context of participation 
in a political campaign for election to public office.”266  The Bellotti Court 
reiterated that the “risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate 
elections . . . simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue[]”267 to 
be decided by a referendum.  Because of Bellotti’s express distinction between 
discussion of issues in the context of a referendum, on the one hand, and 
promoting candidates for election, on the other, Buckley 2.0 would find that 
Bellotti does not stand for a general constitutional bar to singling out 
corporations with respect to speech in the elections of candidates or a 
presumptive right of corporate political speech outside the referendum 
context. 
3.  Citizens United’s Argument Based Upon MCFL  
Buckley 2.0 would find Citizens United’s reliance upon FEC v. Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life (MCFL)268 similarly misplaced.  MCFL was an educational and 
advocacy nonprofit corporation devoted to promoting human life that, by 
virtue of being a corporation, was prevented by the federal prohibition from 
spending its general treasury funds on political advocacy.269  The MCFL 
 
265  Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784–85. 
266  Id. at 788 n.26 (emphasis added).  Citizens United dismissed reliance on the Court’s statement because 
it was in a footnote.  However, the issue of spending by corporations in an election of candidates 
was not before the Court.  In any event, the Bellotti Court also distinguished ballot measures from 
candidate elections in the text of its decision.  See infra note 267 and accompanying text.  
267  Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790. 
268  FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
269  Id. at 242 n.1. 
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Court went to great lengths to distinguish the nonprofit corporation in MCFL 
from commercial corporations.  It noted that MCFL was a small nonstock 
corporation that itself engaged in no commercial activities and, further, 
accepted no money from business entities or unions.270  Indeed, it raised 
money from contributions from individuals and from garage sales, bake sales, 
dances, raffles, and picnics.271  The Court emphasized how burdensome 
requiring a small and unsophisticated nonprofit to establish a PAC would be, 
given the FECA regulations applying to PACs.272   
Despite the MCFL Court’s restriction of its holding to these facts, Citizens 
United cited the administrative burdens catalogued in MCFL as evidence that 
requiring corporations and unions of any size to fund express advocacy with 
PAC money would be unconstitutionally burdensome.  Accordingly, Citizens 
United cited MCFL as precedent for an absolute prohibition against limiting 
corporations and unions from engaging in political speech paid for by 
treasury funds.273   
In reviewing Citizens United’s argument, Buckley 2.0 would note that MCFL 
expressed concerns about the influence of corporate wealth on campaigns274 
and that it explicitly distinguished that situation of commercial corporations 
from “this fund.”275  Thus, in MCFL the Supreme Court concluded that the 
difference between MCFL and commercial corporations was one of kind and 
not merely degree.276  For these reasons, and because MCFL expressly 
asserted that the situation of commercial corporations was a “question not 
before us,”277 Buckley 2.0 would find the analogy between MCFL-type 
corporations and commercial ones untenable.  It would thus conclude that 
MCFL cannot be used as precedent for equating the speech rights of all 
corporations of whatever size and purpose from a First Amendment 
perspective nor as support for Citizens United’s absolutist position regarding 
the regulation of corporate political speech.   
 
270  Id. at 241–42. 
271  Id. at 242. 
272  Id. at 253–55.  Even so, the Court concluded that the burdens were not “insurmountable,” and 
thus actually rested its holding on the lack of a compelling government interest.  Id. at 263. 
273  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 338 (2010). 
274  Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 257–60. 
275  Id. at 258 (emphasis in original). 
276  Id. at 263. 
277  Id.; see also id. at 263–64 (outlining three features of the facts in Mass. Citizens for Life that support the 
Court’s holding, none of which is true of commercial corporations). 
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In sum, Buckley 2.0 would find that Citizens United leaped without 
justification from language about a ballot initiative in Bellotti and a small 
nonprofit advocacy organization funded by individual donations in MCFL to 
its assertion of general political speech rights for corporations of whatever 
size and nature when intervening in a campaign for public office. 
C.  Citizens United’s Inferences from Corporations’ and Unions’ General Political 
Speech Rights 
In addition to rejecting Citizens United’s arguments underlying its assertion 
of general political speech rights for corporations based upon Supreme Court 
precedents, Buckley 2.0 would also question Citizens United’s subsequent 
argument that, because corporations in general have the same right to 
political expression as other speakers, it would be unconstitutional to restrict 
their use of their own resources (including general treasury funds) unless the 
government could show that such restrictions are necessary to avoid the 
threat of corruption or its appearance.   
When the Citizens United Court asserted that such a showing is impossible 
as a matter of law if corporations are not coordinating with candidates, it 
relied upon the original Buckley’s statement that uncoordinated spending at 
that time did not appear to pose a risk of corruption or its appearance.278  
The original Buckley’s statement seems to have referred to independent 
spending by individuals (singly), non-corporate groups or associations, or 
advocacy groups.279  Citizens United then concluded that the same reasoning 
would apply equally to commercial corporations or unions acting 
independently of candidates and, thus, that the existing ban on such entities 
using treasury funds was a violation of the First Amendment’s protection of 
the presumptive political speech rights of corporations.  
For reasons discussed in Part II, Buckley 2.0 would have several grounds 
for rejecting this aspect of the reasoning of Citizens United.  First, as noted 
above,280 Citizens United’s conclusion depended upon a narrow interpretation 
of quid pro quo as bribery or a concrete exchange between the person 
making the expenditure and a candidate or public official, which would be 
impossible if the parties acted independently of one another.  Buckley 2.0, in 
contrast, pointed out that the original Buckley’s understanding of quid pro quo 
was broader and included such things as influencing a candidate as well as 
 
278  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46 (1976) (per curiam). 
279  See supra note 261. 
280  See supra Part II.B.3. 
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obtaining access, and not exclusively outright bribery.  Citizens United’s 
misreading of this aspect of the original Buckley was significant because 
independent spending is not inherently inconsistent with the independent 
spender having influence on candidates, who are aware of the identity of 
those who make outsize expenditures, even in those instances when their 
identities are hidden from the public. 
Second, Buckley 2.0 also concluded that the appearance of corruption 
could arise when big contributors influence or gain access to candidates and 
elected officials, since these signal corruption to ordinary citizens, as they did 
to those who enacted FECA.281  Buckley 2.0 reinforced the original Buckley’s 
observation with contemporary survey data linking people’s perception of 
the influence of money on officials with their distrust of government.282  Its 
conclusion was further strengthened by the proliferation of dark money 
groups to which business interests and wealthy individuals can contribute 
unlimited sums without public knowledge of the donors’ identities despite the 
likelihood that candidates know their identities and will be influenced by such 
spending.283   
Third, the original Buckley claimed that independent spending poses no 
threat of corruption or its appearance only if the spending is totally 
independent.284  After reviewing current campaign finance regulations and 
practices, Buckley 2.0 concluded that conformity with the legal test for 
independence does not guarantee total independence so as to preclude 
concrete exchanges between contributors and representatives, influence, or 
access.285  Among other things, Buckley 2.0 saw the importance of the 
emergence and rapid increase of single-candidate Super PACS staffed by 
former staff or associates of a candidate and permitted to raise money with 
the active assistance of the candidate.286  Moreover, Buckley 2.0 would note 
that the original Buckley assumed there would be disclosure to counter the risk 
of corruption; increasingly, however, campaign spending employs non-
disclosing vehicles, uses non-revealing contributor names, or engages in other 
 
281  See supra notes 216–19 and accompanying text.   
282  See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
283  See supra Part I.C (noting that the amount of money involved cannot be quantified because of the 
absence of disclosure); see also supra notes 52–64 (discussing the reasons for the lack of disclosure 
pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code and FECA). 
284  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (per curiam). 
285  See supra Part II.B.5. 
286  See supra notes 107, 241, 306 and accompanying text. 
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strategies to prevent voters from knowing who is responsible for campaign 
messages.287  Buckley 2.0 would thus conclude that in contrast to the situation 
in 1976, independent spending does in fact “presently appear to pose dangers 
of real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large 
campaign contributions.”288  
Buckley 2.0 would also consider the burden on corporate and union 
political speech that would result from overruling Citizens United in light of the 
empirical data discussed in Part I.  In particular, it would note that spending 
by business interests during the 2016 election cycle was eight-and-a-half 
times more than in the 1976 cycle (in inflation-adjusted dollars) without taking 
into account new spending vehicles made possible by Citizens United.289  In 
addition, business interests would continue to be able to spend general 
treasury funds on issue advocacy in general, as well as on communications 
mentioning candidates for public office on the eve of an election, as long as 
they are not the functional equivalent of express advocacy.290   Buckley 2.0 
would thus conclude that the burden on corporate and union speech—if they 
lacked the opportunities for spending resulting from the holding in Citizens 
United—would not be severe because of the many avenues that would remain 
for these entities to spend enormous sums on campaigns and to participate 
in the discussion of candidates and issues raised by candidates during 
elections.  At the same time, Buckley 2.0 would find that the risk of corruption 
from such spending would be far greater than in 1976 because the original 
Buckley assumed there would be disclosure to counter the risk of corruption291 
and because of the rate of increase of business spending in elections in recent 
decades.  Buckley 2.0 would thus find that Citizens United should be overruled 
because the flaws in its reasoning rendered it inconsistent with the original 
Buckley, upon which it claimed to be based; political speech by business 
interests would continue to enjoy vast amounts of funding; and the threat of 
corruption posed by aggregate campaign spending by such interests in the 
wake of Citizens United has increased greatly due to the spike in contributions 
of millions of dollars. 
 
  
 
287  See supra notes 53–55, 58–68 and accompanying text.   
288  See supra notes 181, 230 and accompanying text.  
289  See supra Part I.A.1. 
290  See supra Part I.D. 
291  See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60–84 (1976) (per curiam).  
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D.  SpeechNow.org and Buckley 2.0’s Analysis of Unlimited Contributions to 
Independent Spending Groups 
 If Buckley 2.0 rejects Citizens United’s claims about the speech rights of 
corporations, the nature of quid pro quo arrangements, and the implications 
of FECA’s independence standard as a matter of law, the holding of 
SpeechNow.org will not survive because of its dependence on these doctrines.  
Even if Buckley 2.0 did not invalidate the central teaching of Citizens United, 
however, it would likely find the later case’s extension of the earlier decision 
illegitimate.  
The original justification for immunizing independent expenditures from 
dollar limits was twofold.  As stated earlier, the main justification was that, 
because such expenditures were unlikely to pose a significant threat of 
corruption and the limits proposed by Congress would impose a “direct and 
substantial” burden on core political speech,292 the government interest in 
imposing the statutory limits on individual expenditures was not compelling 
enough to overcome the protection afforded by the First Amendment.  A 
second and related reason advanced by the original Buckley was that, because 
the dollar limits would only apply to communications advocating the election 
or defeat of candidates for federal office,293 they would prohibit only a small 
subset of political communications that could pose a risk of corruption, 
thereby accomplishing “no substantial societal interest.”294 
Buckley 2.0 would evaluate the constitutionality of limiting contributions 
to independent expenditure entities in light of the original Buckley’s analysis 
of contributions and independent expenditures as well as developments in 
campaign finance law and practices since then.  It would begin by reviewing  
 
 
 
292  As enacted in 1971, FECA imposed a $1000 cap on expenditures by individuals to support any 
specific candidate per year.  Id. at 13.  There was also an overall annual maximum of $25,000.  The 
overall limit was invalidated in McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 204 (2014). 
293  As originally enacted, FECA limits would also have applied to all speech “relative to a clearly 
defined candidate” and thus, would have applied to a wide range of campaign communications.  
However, the Court held that “relative to” was too vague to withstand First Amendment scrutiny 
because the limitation might be imposed on discussions of issues and legislative proposals.  The 
Court thus invalidated the original provision except as it applied to words of express advocacy.  See 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39–44. 
294  Id. at 45. 
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empirical evidence regarding the nature and extent of spending by these 
entities and the role of unlimited contributions in funding them.   
1. In the 2015–2016 election cycle, more than a fifth of the total (reported) 
election spending of $6.5 billion was traceable to independent 
expenditure groups, with Super PACs responsible for more than $1 
billion of this amount.295  Unreported spending by outside groups, 
including issue advocacy calculated to influence the election of specific 
candidates but not subject to reporting, cannot be estimated, but clearly 
added hundreds of millions of dollars to these totals.296 
2. The amount of identifiable outside spending in the 2015–2016 election 
cycle represented an increase of almost 50% over the comparable 
amount in the previous presidential election cycle.297 
3. The massive nature of such spending was not an aberration.  In fact, 
because Donald Trump received an unusual amount of free publicity, 
experts believe that total spending in 2015–2016 was significantly less 
than it would otherwise have been.298  Further, outside spending for the 
2018 mid-term elections was 60% greater than such spending for the 
2014 mid-terms,299 confirming that the trend is for rapid increases in 
outside spending.   
4. Unlimited contributions accounted for almost 90% of receipts of Super 
PACs.300 
5. Unlimited contributions also resulted in an unprecedented 
concentration of campaign spending by wealthy individuals, accounting 
for almost all of the funds raised by independent spending entities. 
Almost 90% of contributions to Super PACs (more than $900 million) 
was attributable to 511 individuals, or one percent of donors.301   
6. It has been estimated that, combining unlimited contributions to Super 
PACs and other independent spending groups and other spending, only 
1% of the top 1% (.01%) of adults were responsible for $2.3 billion in 
outside money raised during the 2015–2016 election cycle.302 
In evaluating these statistics, Buckley 2.0 would first observe that unlimited 
contributions to independent spending groups are not themselves direct 
independent expenditures made by the donors and, thus, are not entitled to 
the same level of constitutional protection as independent expenditures.  
Rather, they are contributions, entitled to the protection afforded 
 
295  See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
296  See supra notes 111–12, 117, 121–28. 
297  See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
298  Sultan, supra note 16 (stating that Trump received free media valued at $5.9 billion in contrast to 
Clinton, who received free media valued at less than $2.8 billion). 
299  See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
300  See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
301  See supra notes 87, 89 and accompanying text. 
302  See Sultan, supra note 16 (noting that most of the money went to independent spending groups); see 
also Persily et al., supra note 85 (noting the discrepancy between what Super PACs raised in 2016 
and what they spent). 
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contributions by the original Buckley.  The contributions reviewed in Buckley, 
of course, were given to candidates and their campaigns, not to groups 
deemed independent by the FEC.  Given the reasoning set forth in Buckley, 
however, this is a distinction without a difference. 
When Buckley upheld FECA’s $1000 cap on contributions by individuals 
to candidates, it argued that contributions are not entitled to the same degree 
of First Amendment protection as expenditures because the burden of a 
contribution cap is only a “marginal restriction” on the donor, since 
contributions are symbolic speech and the cap leaves individuals free to 
participate in elections in other ways, including making independent 
expenditures without dollar restrictions.303  Eliminating SpeechNow.org’s 
validation of unlimited contributions to groups deemed independent by the 
FEC would similarly leave individuals and groups the ability to contribute 
up to $5000 to individual PACs, make unlimited independent expenditures 
of their own, engage in unlimited issue advocacy relevant to an election, and 
participate in the other ways listed by Buckley.304  Buckley 2.0 would thus 
conclude that subjecting contributions made to independent spending 
entities to dollar limits would not excessively burden the speech rights of 
donors to those entities. 
However, the original Buckley considered more than the extent of the 
burden caused by contribution limits.  It upheld those limits because it found 
that the government interest in imposing dollar limits to reduce the threat of 
corruption was substantial.  The unlimited contributions that SpeechNow.org 
validated are made to recipients other than candidates and their campaigns, 
so Buckley 2.0 would have to examine the threat of corruption in this different 
context.  It would explore whether unlimited contributions to Super PACs 
and certain exempt organizations are less prone to be corrupting than 
contributions to candidates because the recipient groups are classified as 
“independent” under federal campaign finance law. 
Buckley 2.0’s conclusion would rest on a combination of factors.  First, it 
would note again that the “totally” independent standard of Buckley is not 
satisfied in connection with several kinds of outside spending groups because 
of the problematic character of the legal standard for independence.305  
Further, even if groups are totally independent, the law does not bar those 
 
303  See supra notes 136–41 and accompanying text. 
304  See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text.  For the greatly increased campaign spending made 
possible by McCutcheon, see supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.   
305  See supra Part II.B.5. 
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who contribute to them from acting in concert with candidates.  Buckley 2.0 
would note, for example, that the FEC permits candidates themselves to 
solicit contributions at fundraising events hosted by spending groups 
regarded as independent under FECA as long as the candidates request 
contributions of no more than $5000 (the FECA limit for contributions to 
candidate PACs), even though the groups themselves can solicit sums of any 
size at the same event and advertise the candidate as a guest or featured 
speaker.306  Further, no law bars candidates from letting potential donors 
know which  groups the candidates regard as potentially helpful to their 
campaigns, including independent spending groups.  Finally, the Buckley 2.0 
Court would observe that exempt organizations claiming to be independent 
are not required to disclose publicly their donors and the amounts they 
donate,307 and even disclosing independent organizations may list donor 
entities that do not reveal the sources of their funds.308  In those instances, 
there is no transparency, which, according to Buckley can deter corruption.309  
Based upon these considerations, Buckley 2.0 would conclude that the risk of 
the reality or appearance of corruption from large contributions to 
independent spending groups is at least as great as the risk of corruption or 
its appearance from contributions made directly to candidates because of the 
close association of candidates to Super PACs, the unlimited size of the 
contributions, and the public’s inability to identify which individuals or 
groups are financially supporting a candidate in many circumstances. 
In addition to reviewing the legal standards governing proximity between 
candidates and independent spending groups in light of contemporary 
campaign practices, Buckley 2.0 would also review the statistics for potentially 
unlimited funding of elections since Citizens United.  It would observe that the 
sums raised have been enormous and that the ability of high-wealth donors 
to aggregate their contributions together in Super PACs and other groups 
has amplified their impact on elections far beyond what extremely large but 
uncoordinated independent expenditures by persons acting singly could 
generate.310  Taking into consideration the prevalence of single-candidate 
independent expenditure groups, the rate at which such spending is growing, 
and the close ties between candidates and legally independent groups, Buckley 
 
306  See, e.g., FEC, ADVISORY OPINION  2011-12 (2011), available at https://www.fec.gov/updates/ao-
2011-12-fundraising-by-candidates-officeholders-and-party-officials-for-independent-expenditure-
only-political-committees/.  The candidates can be speakers or featured guests at these fundraisers. 
307  See supra notes 52–64, 124–25 and accompanying text. 
308  See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text. 
309  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam). 
310  See supra notes 85–93 and accompanying text. 
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2.0 would conclude that regardless of whether the groups and candidates 
coordinate specific strategies and ad buys, the groups have become conduits 
enabling individuals to evade the caps on contributions to candidates by 
millions of dollars. 
Because the sums raised are so great, the threat of corruption is 
correspondingly acute.  The threat is further magnified by the ability of 
independent spending groups funded by unlimited contributions to outspend 
candidates in targeted races.311  In evaluating the significance of these 
statistics, Buckley 2.0 would observe that post-SpeechNow.org, outside groups are 
now in a position to dictate the core of a candidate’s governing agenda by 
threatening to withhold support in general elections or back competitors in 
primaries.  In short, based upon empirical evidence of contemporary 
campaign practices and their effects coupled with the Court’s review of the 
relevant legal standards, Buckley 2.0 would conclude that the SpeechNow.org 
court erred when it held that contributions to independent spending groups 
were incapable of coordination and corruption as a matter of law.  Buckley 
2.0 would, as a consequence, hold that permitting unlimited contributions to 
entities classified as independent under campaign finance law was not 
constitutionally required.  
CONCLUSION 
Since Buckley was decided in 1976, the campaign finance framework that 
it erected has been eroded by a series of decisions claiming to rest upon its 
foundations.  During the same period, campaign financing has been 
transformed by the skyrocketing cost of campaigns, innovative campaign 
practices, rapid increases in the amount of money injected into elections by 
business interests, an increasingly small number of high-wealth individuals 
accounting for an increasingly large percentage of campaign spending, and 
a trend toward employing dark money campaign vehicles and adopting other 
strategies to evade campaign finance disclosure rules.   
Some of these changes were introduced or accelerated by the decisions 
in Citizens United and its progeny, SpeechNow.org.  In important respects, each 
of these decisions made two important errors: they misrepresented the extent 
of their support in precedent and they disregarded empirical campaign 
realities in applying doctrines.  The Buckley 2.0 thought experiment has 
 
311  See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
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attempted to identify and shine a spotlight on these errors.  The result is a 
more faithful reading of the original Buckley and a more honest recognition 
of campaign financing realities that threaten the integrity of representative 
government in America.  
 
